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Abstract
In 2004 the American Political Science Association (“APSA”) published research
exploring whether the rising income inequality in the United States had an effect on
political equality. Although the APSA found tremendous evidence of a correlation
between income and political power, the APSA nonetheless concluded that the issue
could not be conclusively determined without further analysis.
The intent of this thesis is to argue the position that economic inequality is heavily
implicated in both political equality and equality of opportunity, and to propose a
political theory that directly addresses- rather than evades- this issue. A conclusion drawn
in this paper is that it is necessary in liberal capitalist environments to place constraints
on individual economic liberty for the sake of maintaining some degree of economic
equality. I show in this paper that this conclusion is consistent with both the liberal
tradition and American political culture.
This paper accepts –rather than circumvents- the fundamental principle that
income inequality is inevitable in a capitalist democracy as is the ability of money to
purchase positions, power, and assorted privileges. Therefore, it should be the goal of
social justice theory to ensure the gap between the richest and poorest be allowed to be
great enough to respect individual choice and responsibility, but not great enough to
dampen the opportunities available to those born into the bottom of the economic scale or
to permit those born into the top of the economic ladder to exert oppressive power over
the rest.

i

In the final chapter I propose four methods of narrowing economic inequality.
These include a minimum standard, minimum wage and income tax reform, a tax and cap
on wealth and an absolute inheritance cap. These four methods of limiting economic
inequality are directed at narrowing, if not eliminating political inequality and inequality
of opportunity.
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Introduction

A social justice theory can bubble out of the natural law tradition, in which
one can make the case, as many have, that either God or Reason can tell us what is
required of us according to the laws of nature. Social justice can also be conceived
of as an issue of ethics after the fashion of Ronald Dworkin. Regardless of how we
conceptualize it, this paper is directed at illustrating that fair and equal treatment
for all citizens matters in a liberal society and will conclude that where there is vast
economic inequality, individual liberty and political freedom are impinged upon.
My intent for this paper is to argue that vast income inequality correlates
with political inequality - defined as the power to create and amend policies that
affect you - and inequality of opportunity over time. Regardless of the conditions
and constraints upon how those inequalities develop, they must be moderated if we
are to obtain political equality. For purposes of this paper, I will assume that some
degree of wealth inequity must be permitted for the sake of individual liberty in a
liberal culture such as the United States.
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Chapter 1
The Correlation Between Income Inequality, Political Inequality and Inequality of
Opportunity in the United States

In chapter one, evidence is explored that suggests a correlative, if
not causal relationship between income inequality and political
inequality, and that income inequality has become so great in the
United States so as to be a direct threat to equality of opportunity
and political equality. This chapter illustrates this contemporary
problem facing the United States and begins the process of looking
at possible ways to address it. It is the foundation for the
conclusion of this paper.

Introduction
In 2004 the American Political Science Association assembled a task force to
examine three possible indicators that rising income inequality is implicated in
rising political inequality. The task force looked at “citizen participation,
government responsiveness, and patterns of public policy making” (American
Political Science Association 2004). The task force found that not only has the gap
between rich and poor increased, so has the gap between the rich and the middle
class. Still, the task force concluded that there is little evidence that rising income
inequality has a direct effect on widening political disparities, but admitted that it is
a point of concern that requires further analysis (APSA 2004). I will attempt to
illustrate in this chapter that subsequent research has produced the missing
information - that indeed there is now plenty of evidence indicating that income
inequality is strongly implicated in political inequality, and a direct threat to
equality of opportunity.
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The most compelling analysis of this issue is that offered by Jacob Hacker and
Paul Pierson in their book, Winner-Take-All Politics. In it, they illustrate both how
political policy has created this increasingly non-egalitarian income and wealth
distribution as well as how the resulting non-egalitarian income and wealth
distribution has created a political inequality that makes change and reform seem a
daunting task at best. They offer an assessment of how Republicans and Democrats
have contributed in different ways, due to differing ideologies, to the disparity
(Hacker and Pierson 2010, 168-170). They go beyond partisan politics and discover
how the richest among us have not just been influential in affecting economic
policies that benefit them, but have essentially co-opted the political system – they
have not just managed to “get richer” as has always been typical – wealth generally
begets wealth – but they have successfully restructured, “the economy to shift the
risks of their new economic playground downward, saddling Americans with
greater debt, tearing new holes in the safety net, and imposing broad financial risks
on Americans as workers, investors, and taxpayers” (Hacker and Pierson 2010, 13).
Hacker and Pierson’s assessment is relied upon heavily for the conclusions drawn in
this chapter.
This section will outline the manner in which politics has created and
reinforced rapidly rising income inequality and how that has both led to and
increased political inequality and inequality of opportunity. Finally, I will examine
some possible remedies for combatting this disturbing trend.

3

Statistics on Rising Income Inequality in the United States
There is little dispute that as compared to the post-war era through the
1970s, the 1970s forward have shown a tremendous increase in the disparity in
income growth among the upper, middle and working classes. During the period of
1947-1973 family income growth among the lowest quintile increased by 115
percent, the middle quintile increased by 97.7 percent and the top quintile increased
by 84 percent. By contrast for the years 1973-2000 family income growth among
the lowest quintile increased by 10.3 percent, the middle quintile increased by 24.1
percent and the top quintile increased by 61.6 percent (APSA 2004). It could be
argued that the lowest quintile still saw an increase in income and that the top
quintile also saw less of an increase in income; however, there is evidence to
support the notion that the real income of working class Americans has declined
over this period, when benefits and such are factored in, that we will examine a little
bit later – while the top quintile became substantially better off. Finally, during the
years 2000-2005 income growth decreased for all groups, but by the greatest
percentage among the lowest quintile. Real family income growth fell by nearly 8
percent among the lowest earners and 0.9 percent among the highest earners
(Jacobs and King 2009, 17). A rapid change in economic distributive patterns has
clearly occurred – this paper accepts that as a fact and point of departure.1

The APSA’s analysis attempts to show that since the 1970s the United States has become more
egalitarian in terms of race and gender and simultaneously less egalitarian in terms of income.
However, while it may be true that overt inequalities based on gender or race have lessened, Blacks
and Latinos both are still more likely to be working class as well as more likely to be at the bottom of
whatever class they belong to. For all of the alleged progress America has made regarding racial
inequality since desegregation and the Civil Rights Movement, during the 1980s the income gap
between Whites and Blacks returned to 1950s levels. (APSA 2004) Indeed black married couples in
1
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Additionally, the richest 1 percent’s share of the national income has risen
steadily since the Carter Administration, implicating changes in long-term policies
that allowed for the vast gains under Republicans and Democrats alike. Even
modest income growth among the working and middle classes have largely been
due to increased work hours – all the while, since the 1970s employers have steadily
decreased benefits (Hacker and Pierson 2010, 26, 30). While the United States
economy experienced astronomical growth overall, the majority of Americans went
further into debt, worked more hours for the same pay, lost benefits and found that
the potential for social mobility has fallen drastically (Hacker and Pierson 2010, 2633).

History and Possible Causes of Increasing Inequality
The standard explanation for the dramatic rise in income and wealth
inequality in the United States since 1973 (as opposed to the more egalitarian
growth patterns during the post-war period) generally rests on a theory of
inevitability due to the globalization of the economy and rapid technological
advancement (Bartels 2008, 17). This explanation, however, fails to tell the whole
story. The most obvious problem with the story is that market globalization and
rapid technological advancement have occurred globally, and other wealthy
democracies – Canada and most western European countries – have managed to
maintain a more egalitarian income and wealth distribution structure. This section
which both adults work, as compared to similarly situated white couples, earn 20 percent less
income and possess 80 percent less net worth. (Jacobs and King 2009, 20) This is an important point
of interest, but unfortunately beyond the scope of this paper.
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will examine some of the policies and tendencies in the United States that have
contributed to rising inequality and the decreased social mobility that goes hand in
hand with inequality of opportunity. In the United States “most of the shift in the
income distribution has been from the bottom 90 percent to the top 5 percent.” This
suggests that “power relations” not just “market forces” is a likely suspect (Bartels
2008, 17).
One possible answer to the economic problems facing the United States is
partisan politics. The Republicans cater to the rich and the Democrats cater to the
poor is a popular sentiment. However, it’s not as simple as that. In fact Democratic
Presidents Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton signed into law most of the policies that
have been implicated in the U.S. financial crisis as well as rising inequality, even
while Congress was controlled by the Democrats during the first two years of Bill
Clinton’s presidency and the entire four years of Carter’s term (Jacobs and King
2009, 7-9). These policy shifts will be examined in detail in another section of this
chapter. For now it is important to note that electing the “right” person to office is
not necessarily the cure – the presidency of Democrat Barack Obama, who was
elected in an atmosphere of hope that it might be, is a good example of how small a
piece of the puzzle the president actually is. Obama has, with few exceptions,
essentially carried on the policies of the Republican administration that preceded
him – by all accounts, those policies don’t necessarily reflect Obama’s desires or
personal beliefs, but for a variety of troubling reasons, they remain. The most
obvious reason is the basic structure of the United States’ constitutional government
– bicameralism, separation of powers and federalism all place constraints upon the
6

power of political officials to enact policies even when said policies appear to have
popular support (Shapiro 2003, 109-110). The tale of rising inequality shows both
parties are responsible for agenda setting in Washington and both are implicated
(Hacker and Pierson 2010, 168-169). As Bartels demonstrates, however, Democrats
do a better job of maintaining a semblance of egalitarianism than do Republicans:

“On average, the real incomes of middle-class families
have grown twice as fast under Democrats as they have
under Republicans, while the real incomes of working
poor families have grown six times as fast under
Democrats as they have under Republicans” (Bartels
2008, 3).

Additionally, the real value of the minimum wage has risen significantly
under Democrats but fallen significantly under Republicans (Bartels 2008, 226).
Partisan politics obviously matters, but both Democrats and Republicans –
presidents and legislators - are still obliged to operate in an atmosphere of
indebtedness to corporate wealth, rendering non-egalitarian policies and trends a
much deeper political issue than simply choosing one side over the other. Because
campaign contributions are necessary for the success of both parties, Democrats are
just as likely to be “especially responsive to the views of resource-rich constituents,
notwithstanding the historical association of the Democratic Party with the political
interests of the working class and the poor” (Bartels 2008, 268). Furthermore, the
deregulatory policies and tax cuts, that have accelerated the disparity in income and
wealth, have been implemented with the support of Democrats, not surprising given
that the majority of the billions of dollars spent every year on politics isn’t spent on
7

election campaigns, but on lobbying – “sustained, intense efforts to shape what
happens in Washington” (Hacker and Pierson 2010, 114). These sustained lobbying
efforts by wealthy corporations have a tremendous disparate impact on policy
making that is unavailable to non-profit groups and individuals. The number of
registered corporate lobbyists in Washington grew from 175 in 1971 to 2,500 in
1982 and the number of “corporate PACs increased from under 300 in 1976 to over
1,200 by the middle of 1980” (Hacker and Pierson 2010, 118). These characters
have been the most influential on government policy makers both by virtue of
money and proximity – these are the people who ultimately have the ear of
lawmakers – both Democrat and Republican.
One of the most basic economic policies contributing to the rise in inequality
is that governing the federal minimum wage. Again, in defiance of broad public
support for a rising minimum wage that keeps pace with inflation and despite its
increase in real value during the 1950s and 1960s, “the real value of the minimum
wage has fallen by almost 45% since the late 1960s” (Bartels 2008, 224). Raising
the minimum wage is often condemned as reducing employment opportunities, but
there is little evidence to support that thesis (Bartels 2008, 227). The falling value
of the minimum wage is strongly implicated in the increasing income gap between
rich and poor, and one possible reason for the decline in the minimum wage is the
simultaneous decline in union membership (Bartels 2008, 226, 240). As business
organized more strongly and injected more capital into Washington, they were able
to use the Taft-Hartley Act to shift their operations to right-to-work states and
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employers became ever more brazen in violating fair labor standards and blocking
union organizing (Hacker and Pierson 2010, 128).
While this information may be troubling in general, the most disturbing point
for the purpose of this paper is that the overwhelming majority (in some surveys,
more than seventy percent) of Americans are in favor of minimum wage increases
that keep pace with inflation - in some surveys “supporters have outnumbered
opponents by margins of about four to one” (Bartels 2008, 226). Clearly something
other than democracy is at work here. It’s not just the minimum wage, as
government policy does not reflect public opinion on education, healthcare or
defense spending either (Jacobs and King 2009, 146-147). The following
observation is a good prelude to the discussion on oligarchy and political equality
that follow later in this chapter, as it is illustrative of a political policy that increases
economic inequality and continues, contrary to public opinion:
A conservative minority has been able to block
substantial increases in the minimum wage, even when
the Democrats had unified control of Congress under
Jimmy Carter and in the early Clinton administration.
Therefore, the real minimum wage has fallen… However,
it begs the question of why minimum wage rates have
been set in nominal dollars. After all, many other federal
benefits and income thresholds are automatically
adjusted to take account of inflation (Bartels 2008, 234).

The best explanation for the dramatic increase in inequality since 1973 is
what Hacker & Pierson label “drift.” They assert that in addition to big changes in
positive law, government nonresponse to dynamic economic conditions is the major
way in which politics has exacerbated income inequality (Hacker and Pierson 2010,
9

43). To explore this we’ll look at both changes in positive law and the lack of
changes that worked together to create inequality. Accepting as fact that the “free”
market does not operate independently of government – government rules and lack
of rules shape the market – this exploration of policy will hopefully illuminate a path
to reversing the vast disparity that threatens our political ideals (Hacker and
Pierson 2010, 44, 82).
Some very basic policies have clearly contributed to rising inequality. The
main areas of concern are taxation, “government’s treatment of unions, the
regulation of executive pay, and the policing of financial markets” (Hacker and
Pierson 2010, 56). And contrary to popular sentiment the problem didn’t start with
the Bush tax cuts, nor did it start with “Reaganomics.” The initial change in policy
that led to a dramatic redistribution of wealth upward began with Jimmy Carter.
Under Carter (and a Democrat-controlled congress) a proposal to prevent future
erosion of the minimum wage - by tying it to the manufacturing wage - was
defeated, as was a proposal to update outdated labor relations laws and a health
care reform proposal. What was passed was a tax bill that sharply cut the capital
gains tax - which only benefits the wealthy, while simultaneously raising payroll
taxes - which adversely affects workers and small business owners (Hacker and
Pierson 2010, 99). This set the stage for 1981 when the devastating Economic
Recovery and Tax Act was passed reducing even further the capital gains tax, the
estate tax and taxes on corporations (Hacker and Pierson 2010, 134). In the 1950s
corporate income tax accounted for 30 to 40 percent of federal revenue, but by
2007, even with record profitability corporate income taxes fell to 14.7 percent of
10

total federal revenue. At the same time payroll taxes went from 8 to 10 percent of
federal revenue to 35 to 40 percent (Jacobs and King 2009, 159).
One clear example of the concept of drift is the Financial Accounting
Standards Board’s attempt to regulate CEO compensation in the early 1990s.
Corporations began awarding stock options to CEOs that were not tied to long-term
performance and were not written off as an expense for accounting purposes. The
FASB saw a number of problems with this, primarily a lack of transparency, and
proposed reform. Business interests joined together, badgered the Chair of the SEC,
and ultimately, with the help of prominent Congressional Democrats, ensured its
defeat (Hacker and Pierson 2010, 246-247).

Income Inequality Creates Inequality of Political Power
The essential point is that where the possession of
political power is due to the possession of economic
power or wealth, whether the number of persons be large
or small, that is oligarchy, and when the unpropertied
class have power, that is democracy (Bartels 2008, 284).

In “Oligarchy in the United States” Jeffrey Winters and Benjamin Page make
the case that it is plausible to conclude that the United States may be an oligarchy
even as it is a democracy (Winters and Page 2009). Defining oligarchy as a specific
kind of minority power that is material in nature, they posit that the oligarchy may
coexist with democracy, defining and limiting it without abolishing it entirely. They
assert that wealth is not just a major source of political power, but is rather the most
important source of power concerning economic policies. This power then is used
11

by the very wealthy to maintain their wealth and yet other issues that don’t affect
economic status are then left to the democratic process. This is illustrated in a
couple of different ways. First, the article asserts that there is evidence that the
policies that affect the wealthy, such as taxation, international business, finance
regulations and redistribution of wealth do not reflect public opinion on said
matters (Winters and Page 2009). In support of this they point out that an analysis
of the roll call votes of Senators indicates they tend to vote in line with the opinions
of their wealthiest constituents rather than the majority of their constituents. Larry
Bartels uncovered the same phenomena pointing out that the opinions of those at
the bottom third of the income distribution scale were “entirely unconsidered” by
their representatives (Bartels 2008 253-254).
Winters and Page use income and wealth based power indices to show that
the greater one’s wealth the smaller number of people one needs to agree with
him/her on a political issue. By contrast those with the least wealth need to rely on
vast coalitions of like-minded people to have any affect on the political process at all.
In other words one person with a lot of money can affect the political system as
effectively as a great coalition of people with no money (Winters and Page 2009).
Their conclusion is that the top one-hundredth of one percent of the wealthiest
Americans has 463 times the individual power than an individual in the bottom 90
percent (Winters and Page 2009). The source of this power can be overt such as
lobbying efforts and constitutional protections of wealth and also take more subtle
forms, such as opinion shaping and electoral impact which is increasingly controlled
by money (Winters and Page 2009). When this extreme political power is
12

concentrated among such a small minority of the wealthiest individuals, it is difficult
not to concede that it looks an awful lot like oligarchy.
Further support for the idea that oligarchy coexists with democracy in the
United States is the quandary of “why don’t the 50.1% of the people on the lower
end of the income scale raise taxes on the upper 49.9% at will?” It may be due in
part to cultural phenomena such as belief in the ability to become rich one day even
if poor now, skepticism of government’s ability to effectively run social programs,
the two-party system – both of which advocate more or less of the status quo, and a
tendency to compare the U.S. capitalist system to the economic disaster that was
communism in the Soviet Union rather than compare it to the socialist democracies
on display in western Europe (Gelman 2008, 139-140). Another possibility is that
when judging the fairness of a system people tend to compare themselves to those
who are similarly situated to them, not to those who are far more or far less well off
then they are (Shapiro 2003, 119-121). However, these are not adequate
explanations in light of the tendency of the poor to support the Democratic Party,
which is slightly more supportive of wealth redistribution and social welfare
policies (Gelman 2008, 3). Also, if it is true that the wealthy ruling class has a great
deal of power over swaying public opinion, then it might be that what the press
reports people think or what the politicians assert the people value in their
speeches is suspect. There are a lot of wealthy, older, white people in Arizona, for
instance – a Republican voting demographic – therefore Republicans tend to win
elections in Arizona. Given the low voting rates of poor people, the high voting rates
of older, white and wealthier people, and the large number of resident and non13

resident aliens in the state, one can hardly conclude that the majority of people
living in Arizona likely believe that the wealthy should not be subject to increased
taxation or that Chevron should be subsidized by tax-payer money, while
individuals are left to their own devices. Yet, “Arizonans overwhelmingly believe…”
is what is heard in the news. American citizens’ devotion to individual liberty does
come into play, but it’s not an adequate explanation for the excessive economic
inequality that has developed over the past four decades. In fact, recent surveys
show that most Americans in general are in favor of government programs that
reduce economic inequality (Jacobs and King 2009, 135).
Another commonly touted belief is that the working poor are voting for
Republican candidates against their own economic best interest due to devotion to
certain conservative social issues. However, statistics don’t bear this out. The
working poor tend to be primarily concerned with the economic issues that affect
them directly – if anything the working poor have become more devoted to the
Democratic Party (Bartels 2008, 67). Further evidence suggests that contrary to the
caricature of the uneducated poor person who votes republican due to homophobia
or other culturally conservative issues, the reality is the low income voters tend to
vote primarily on economic issues. It is the upper -income voters who have the
luxury of time and excess funds to worry about maintaining some sort of cultural
status quo (Bartels 2008, 87).
The answer appears to be political rather than cultural, economic or
technological. A possible response to the question of why Republicans win elections
when common sense would suggest the Democrats have numbers on their side is
14

offered by Larry Bartels. According to Bartels, voter behavior can be tied to the
cycles of economic growth during the incumbent’s presidency. He suggests that
Democrats may be better at generating income growth overall, but Republicans are
better at doing it during the election year and that voters have a short attention
span which leads to the rewarding of the Republican Party and punishment of the
Democratic Party (Bartels 2008, 104-109).2
The analysis presented by Bartels suggests that voters gave Democratic
presidents no electoral credit for consistently producing stupendous income growth
in the second years of their four-year terms (ranging from 4.0% for upper-middleclass families to 5.7% for the working poor), while Republican presidents have paid
no electoral cost for consistently presiding over declines in real income for middleclass and working poor families in the second years of their four-year terms (Bartels
2008, 109).

What Happens to the Ideal of Political Equality
The APSA taskforce concluded that among those with income under $15,000
per year, only half vote. By contrast, among those with an income of over $75,000
per year, nine-tenths vote (APSA 2004). Voting is the most basic, easiest and one
could argue least effective or important method of political participation, but it is a
common benchmark used to determine public opinion and degree of apathy. In

2

Even if not personally identifying with one party or the other, the republicans’ ability to look better
at the end of four years than the democrats generally do has an effect on re-election. One possible
explanation to consider is that the democrats’ method of generating income growth requires the
cooperation of republicans, who can strategically block their efforts at opportune times.
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addition those in the lower income bracket are less likely to be affiliated with a
political organization, serve on boards, protest, be involved in other community
activities or make campaign contributions. The task force suggests that the reason
the working poor don’t vote is because they lack the skills and they are not
motivated (APSA 2004). But there are several other possible reasons for this. First,
the working poor are less likely to view their immediate economic circumstances as
tied to any particular administration – those without 401K’s and homes and such
are not as likely to follow the musings of the Federal Reserve Chairman, for example.
The working poor may be aware that they’re less likely to be listened to by
politicians and may be more likely to view one as bad (or good) as the other.
Additionally, lower income jobs offer less flexibility, so they may just be less able to
make it to the polls.
In terms of public opinion, the media pay a great deal more attention to the
economic concerns of stockholders and homeowners than to the concerns of the
very poor (Bartels 2008, 116). But even those in a lower-income bracket see their
fate as entrenched with the fate of the wealthier classes. They may not be worried
about the stock market in terms of a personal portfolio, but they are worried about
the availability of jobs, quality of education, gas prices and such3 (Bartels 2008,
125). The unfortunate result of all this is that an examination of Senator roll call
votes both on economic and social issues indicates that the “bottom third of the

That some low-income voters buy the republican story of the necessity for low taxes on
corporations in order to stimulate job creation might be a better possible explanation for the
minority of those that do vote republican than the idea that they are voting based upon social rather
than economic issues.
3

16

income distribution received no weight at all in the voting decisions of their
senators,” whereas the senators are slightly more responsive to middle income
earners and “quite responsive” to the opinions of their constituents in the top tier of
the income distribution (Bartels 2008, 254, 260, 265, 267). Even worse, “when the
poorest people in a state support a policy, their senators are less likely to vote for it”
(Hacker and Pierson 2010, 111).

Possible Remedies Involve Inequality of Opportunity
American culture more readily accepts economic inequality than their
European counterparts for a variety of reasons that are beyond the scope of this
paper, but one American value that is held dear is the notion that regardless of one’s
background, everyone has the opportunity to become among the very wealthy. The
pattern since the 1970s shows that the potential for class mobility has decreased to
nearly nonexistent and this, rather than inequality itself might be the factor that
finally mobilizes the American public to address the issue (APSA 2004). Surveys
indicate that three-quarters of Americans believe that the rags to riches tale is still
possible – which is true, there is about a 2% chance that someone born to the
bottom tenth of the income scale will one day work their way to the top tenth
(Jacobs and King 2009, 141). While the majority of Americans espouse a belief in
egalitarianism, there appears to be a disconnect between a recognition of those
values and a recognition of how income inequality actually affects real social
outcomes such as social mobility, equality of opportunity and equality of political
power (Bartels 2008, 161). The real lack of political equality exacerbates the
17

challenges to the a path of reform – the lower-income and less wealthy classes are at
a fundamental disadvantage in terms of ability to influence social policies that affect
their opportunities to better their financial positions. It appears, given the ways in
which increased inequality has come about, that it’s possible to reverse these unfair
economic trends, but it requires action on the part of those adversely affected, and
people with lower incomes require greater coalitions to affect government change –
so it’s not going to be easy (Winters and Page 2009).
Fortunately though, one recurring theme in all the works examined here is
that there is hope in reversing the trend of inequality and the remedy is
mobilization and organization among the working and middle classes. This is a little
bit like saying the cure for obesity is to eat less and exercise more – everybody
knows that, but that doesn’t mean anybody’s going to do it. Still several possible
practical steps may have impact over time. If Hacker and Pierson are correct in
their conclusion that it’s American politics, not the changing economy or
technological advancement determining this outcome, then the problem is manmade and there is hope for a remedy through political reform (Hacker and Pierson
2010, 300).
One of the most important ways that the working poor can affect their
immediate outcomes is union participation, which has fallen by half since the 1970s.
In addition to that various smaller organized groups need to create greater
coalitions. But what do these organized groups need to do exactly? They need to
seek reforms of the political and economic system that serve to redistribute the
wealth downward rather than upward – tying the minimum wage rate to the
18

average wage rate and tying CEO compensation to the long-term performance of the
company are both important steps. Greater regulations of financial institutions,
aggressively graduated tax policies that burden corporations and the very wealthy
rather than the middle class and campaign finance reforms are also necessary
measures. One thing that is clear, updated regulatory policies that reflect the
changing business landscape are an indispensible part of effective reform (Hacker
and Pierson 2010, 257). This will be tricky given the American political system is
designed to maintain the status quo and that American lawmakers tend to be from
the upper class – this is why organization among the masses is so important (Hacker
and Pierson 2010, 113). Reform for the good of the poor, the working poor and the
middle class has been accomplished in the past and surely can be done again.
One success story that may serve as a template for reform is the passing of
the GI Bill. Spearheaded by the American Legion, a large coalition was formed
(nearly 80 percent of young American men at the bill’s passage were veterans of
World War II) and through “mailings, petition drives, entreaties to local journalists,
even a motion picture clip promoting the bill,” ultimately lawmakers had no choice
but to pay attention (Hacker and Pierson 2010, 137-139). It appears that due to
economic inequality and the resultant loss of political power among ordinary
citizens that something like this can’t be done again, but a large group of people with
“the ability to pool and concentrate resources, develop expertise, and sustain focus”
can wield political influence, even in light of present conditions (Hacker and Pierson
2010, 139). The ability to organize appears to matter in terms of political outcomes,
and this is where those with fewer resources are at a disadvantage.
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Conclusion
It should be clear at this point that political policy has been the primary
culprit in the rapid rise in income disparity witnessed in the United States since
1973. It should also be clear that those on the losing end of those policies – the
working poor and what remains of the middle class – are at a clear disadvantage
should they attempt to affect political change. Thus illustrating that income
inequality and political inequality go hand in hand. The notion that the government
exists by and for the people is difficult to espouse in such an environment and selfgovernment – an indispensible value in the liberal tradition – is rapidly
deteriorating. Broad coalitions of those devoted to maintaining a strong middle
class and greater unionization of workers appears to be the most logical policydriven remedy.
A thriving capitalist economy demands strong government regulation and
protections for workers so as to avoid the economic aristocracy that has emerged in
the United States. The protection of employees in the workplace does not just
benefit them economically, it preserves our political freedom and in turn political
freedom is used to protect our individual and collective economic interests (Hacker
and Pierson 2010, 298-301). As Franklin Roosevelt famously quipped, “political
equality is “meaningless in the face of economic inequality” (Hacker and Pierson
2010, 306).
It’s disheartening as it seems that a financial collapse rivaling that of 1929 or
something more awful than a mass discontent among the majority of Americans
who have lost ground financially may be necessary. Unfortunately, those most
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affected by wealth disparity are less capable of organizing for reform and those in
the middle have just enough going for them that fear of losing what they have seems
to override a collective desire to try to gain more – even when the status quo is
viewed as unjust, there is a tendency in a formally egalitarian society to protect
individual ability to achieve the “American Dream” than to focus on redistributive
issues (Shapiro 2003, 122 -127). The more wealth a minority accumulates, the
more affordable it is for them to appease the middle class with small incentives like
tax breaks for education or mortgage interest, thus putting them in the position of
fearing losing the privileges they have too much to collectively organize with the
poor against the very wealthy few (Shapiro 2003, 139).
The research on boundary permeability thus suggests that
modest tokenism may be sufficient to defuse pressure for
collective redistribution, even when the status quo is seen as
unjust” (Shapiro 2003, 123).

The median voter may also be affected by “downward-looking framing” which
means they fear not just the poor, but becoming one of the poor – thus demonization
of the poor as being lazy and such prevents the middle class from being able to
relate to them (Shapiro 2003, 131). More troubling is that the more one is alienated
from the American Dream the less likely one is to seek change, even with nothing to
lose.
…low status and a sense of deprivation tend to be associated
with the belief that one is ineffective… There is too much despair
and not enough anger” (Shapiro 2003, 127-127).
Without a legitimate threat to the status quo, it appears unlikely that increased
oversight of corporations, decreased corporate lobbying, campaign finance or tax
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reform are going to emerge. Some sort of drastic challenge will have to occur – and
it will likely come from the losers in the “winner-take-all” economy, as the winners
are not likely to give up their privilege quietly. Just as wealth begets wealth, power
begets power – the economically disadvantaged are at an ever-increasing political
disadvantage – this is what must be overcome in the end. In any event, it is clear
that vast economic inequality is a threat to the principles of self-government and
equality of opportunity inherent in the American tradition, and the construction of a
political theory that will adequately address it is the paramount concern of this
paper.
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Chapter 2
Development in Liberal Discourse Regarding the Relationship Between Economic
Equality and Economic Liberty

In Chapter 2 a history of development in liberal thought and
attention to economic inequality is traced. Through this process it
is suggested that infringing upon individual economic liberty to a
certain extent for the purpose of maintaining some degree of
economic equality is compatible with liberal ideals on the whole.
This is important to the conclusion of this paper, because I argue
that the remedies proposed are compatible with the values of
liberal American society.

Introduction
In the realm of political theory, classical liberalism is readily identifiable by,
among other things, its defense of two concepts: equality of persons and individual
liberty. These notions were a radical departure from the presumptions intrinsic to
the feudalistic political structures from which they emerged. This chapter
illustrates that while early liberal thinkers posited equality as an ideal and
presumed inherent equality of individuals in crafting their theories, their focus was
predominantly on the importance of liberty. Unforeseen by early liberal thinkers
was that an unfortunate byproduct of liberty is, while people may be equal in
inherent human dignity, they are not equal in ability. Over time this creates a de
facto caste system, because in addition to natural talent and ability, some are born
with economic resources unavailable to others. These resources create an
inequality of opportunity to develop one’s talents and abilities, posing a dilemma for
liberal political cultures and social justice theory.
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As liberalism emerged as the status quo in countries such as Great Britain,
France and the United States this became increasingly visible to liberal theorists,
and evolved to be a predominant problem evaluated by liberal thinkers after World
War II, which had been the result of, among other things, the inability of liberal
political cultures to effectively deal with the economic problems of the day – a
necessary condition for fascism to take hold. It turns out that birth matters even in
liberal cultures where, in theory, it should not. In the United States a caste system
has evolved, though it is not recognized as such. The liberal American political
culture continues to hold itself up as the example of a society in which all are equal
in opportunity, because anyone can, in theory, overcome tremendous obstacles and
become the next Rockefeller, President Obama, Bill Gates, and so forth.
In theory all are equal in the United States, but in practice, where forced
equality threatens the economic liberty of some, liberty generally carries the day.
This is despite the fact that as seen in the work of Isaiah Berlin and John Rawls, in
particular, the economically disadvantaged, by definition, are denied basic liberties.
But in American culture poverty is viewed as more of a personal problem (the result
of poor choices and such) and the myth (which is also the reality for some) that one
has an equal opportunity to overcome that situation tends to prevail. An awareness
of this dichotomy – that to obtain economic equality requires an imposition on the
liberty of some, while allowing for economic inequality imposes upon the liberty of
others - is apparent in the later works of Rawls and Berlin, in a way it was largely
unnoticed by John Stuart Mill and entirely unnoticed by Benjamin Constant.
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This chapter is aimed at evaluating the manner in which liberal discourse
evolved to address this tension between two fundamental features of liberalism:
liberty and equality. For the purpose of this paper it will be treated as a progressive
movement from a primary focus on Liberty to a primary focus on equality in liberal
political discourse. The works of Benjamin Constant, John Stuart Mill, Isaiah Berlin
and John Rawls are all evaluated for their recognition of economic inequality, the
degree to which they concerned themselves with it, and the differences in their
treatment of it, including speculation about how the manners in which they were
situated in history may have affected these views.
While Constant presumed inherent equality, economic inequality appeared
to be a given for him, and he focused on individual liberty to pursue one’s interests
and engage in commercial activity. Mill, writing one-hundred years later, did notice
economic inequality, but while he also valued equality, defined as inherent human
dignity, his concern with economic inequality seemed largely to arise from a sense
of morality and humanitarianism, which led him in several cases to advocate for the
freedom of the oppressed, the working class being simply one among others, such as
women and African slaves. Isaiah Berlin was the first of these thinkers to take issue
with the fact that the economically disenfranchised do not have the liberty to direct
their lives as they wish. But his writings are concerned far more with the defense
and protection of individual liberty from oppressive regimes than with the problem
of economic inequality. John Rawls, on the other hand, was perfectly situated in
time and place to notice this inconsistency in liberal political cultures – in the
twentieth century United States, of which he was a product, liberty from an
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oppressive government was not a pressing political problem, as such, he was free to
notice the problem of economic inequality. In contemporary America, the problem
of economic inequality is not just something to notice, but a pressing issue of our
time.

Benjamin Constant’s Defense of Liberty Above All Else
Working on an apparent assumption of equality of persons, Constant didn’t
concern himself with natural inequalities or inequalities of wealth and privilege. At
the time of his writing, liberal political associations were perhaps too new for him to
foresee the problems that would be created. Perhaps having been socialized in the
late 18th, early 19th century, he may have adhered to equality as an ideal, even while
his theories are inherently elitist – he clearly advocated governance by those who
had the knowledge and the time to govern, which means wealth, but doesn’t seem
troubled by the idea that some people will be wealthy enough to have access to the
opportunity to hold office and even vote and some will not. Rather he seems to
accept that as the given state of things and doesn’t appear moved to find that fact
unjust or intrinsically unequal (Constant 1988, 214-217). Heavily influenced by
Adam Smith, Constant’s writings reflect the belief that individuals freely pursuing
their personal interests promoted the public good. In addition he was European,
and even contemporary Europeans maintain their nominal aristocracies, leaving at
least a slight comfort with notions of privilege by birth, whereas Americans tend to
believe their mythos that everyone is born equal. The reality of economic disparity
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combined with this mythology allows the de facto caste system that has developed
in the United States to perpetuate unexamined – as presumably everyone has the
opportunity to be as wealthy as possible, if they are willing to work hard and make
smart choices.
Constant’s primary concern was simply that men had the liberty to pursue
their economic goals – he viewed the key to happiness as independently going about
one’s goals and pursuits, free from interference (Constant 1988, 104). He viewed
liberty as priceless, “because it gives soundness to our mind, strength to our
character, elevation to our soul” (Constant 1988, 110). While liberal societies hadn’t
developed to the point that wealth inequality became a visible issue at the time
Constant was writing, even he had a degree of awareness of the privilege it
provided, he just didn’t seem to find it troubling (Constant 1988, 118 & 214). He
did, however, make a brief comment on “excessive wealth,” in which he states that
“wealth is power,” but the recognition of this problem for Constant seems to be
limited to the wealth of government accumulated through excessive taxation of the
poor, as opposed to the contemporary problem of the excessive wealth of
individuals, and the unfair competition for social goods as well as the imbalance of
political power that situation creates (Constant 1988, 271-272). Constant’s view
was that the accordance of liberty to live their private lives as they deemed fit
promotes an “intellectual equality” which he viewed as desirable (Constant 1988,
327). Writing amidst the turmoil of the times in which he was situated, freedom
from governmental imposition and leaving individuals free to pursue their interests
was the main focus for Constant.
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John Stuart Mill’s Elitist Humanitarian Liberalism
John Stuart Mill made a significant contribution to political theory and his
ideas evolved over time from an initial primary concern with liberty to reflect more
recognition of the problems intrinsic to economic inequality. In On Liberty, as the
title might indicate, he is primarily concerned with liberty, both from oppressive
government and majority tyranny, whether state-sanctioned or not. He seems to
presume economic inequality, but does not necessarily view wealth (or lack of
wealth) to be an important factor in the exercise of individual liberty (Mill 2010, 8 &
47). Like Constant, he presumed inequality of wealth and also presumed that the
wealthy and learned are better suited to govern (Mill 2010, 43 & 158). In his essay,
On Representative Government, he does make references to the problems of the
dominant class making decisions in its own interest, leaving the others powerless,
but he does not seem to attribute this to a problem of wealth disparity, so much as
the truism that “power” necessarily corrupts and that a proper government should
have safeguards against abuse of power (Mill 2010, 161-165).
Where the principle of equality appears to enter the equation for Mill, just as
with Constant, is a recognition that the wealthy, the state, the “natural aristocracy”
or whomever, is not entitled to violate any individual’s right to liberty. Moreover, he
doesn’t appear to be very egalitarian at all, except that he seems to presume equal
political rights. Further, in some of Mill’s work he appears to endorse a system of
trade that inevitably creates and perpetuates economic disparity, stating the losers
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in the competitive game of trade are just that and it is not the business of the state to
regulate (Mill 2010, 61). To be fair to Mill, it would appear from the development
and revisions of his work in his lifetime that his opinion on this changed
substantially over time, as he offered some positive analyses of communism,
socialism and other types of cooperative and collective economic organization (Mill
1848, II.1.15). Mill seems to have noticed that pursuit of the private good doesn’t
always serve the public good the way that Adam Smith had predicted it would.
However economically progressive he may have been, however, Mill’s elitism
was evident. Like Constant, he presumes class distinction and doesn’t appear
troubled by it in and of itself. Most alarming is his willingness to restrict the liberty
of those lacking wealth to procreate, without any seeming concern for this
inequality infringing upon their liberty (Mill 2010, 69 and Mill 1848, II.12.9 &
II.13.4). He even posits that the solution to low wages is that the poor stop
reproducing so much (Mill 1848, II.13.10). On the other hand he does seem to have
some sense of a commitment to the promotion of equal opportunity to compete in
society in his discussion of education, in which he supposes the state ought to pay
for poor children to be educated if need be (Mill 2010, 67-68). Mill exhibits
sympathy toward the idea that in a competitive laboring society – which he views as
good – reforms were needed to benefit all by essentially ensuring a fair competition:

“And there is reason to rejoice at whatever makes the
privileged classes of skilled artisans feel that they have
the same interests, and depend for their remuneration on
the same general causes, and must resort for the
improvement of their condition to the same remedies, as
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the less fortunately circumstanced and comparatively
helpless multitude” (Mill 1848, IV.7.65).

In his essay On Representative Government, Mill acknowledges a power
differential between the “working-class” and the “masters.” He argues that it is
unfortunate that the workers have no voice in parliament, and that it is a problem,
and he also explores the “evil” of low wages, but stops short of questioning the
problem of the class distinction itself (Mill 2010, 136 and Mill 1848, II.11-II.13.1).
He does briefly lament the “evil” of a “non-labouring class,” but his concern that
there exists a class which doesn’t have to use its labor to contribute to the wellbeing of the whole of society doesn’t seem to mean that he necessarily opposes
disparity of wealth distribution (Milll 1848, IV.7.1-IV.7.2). Mill differs from Constant
in that his ideal ruling class is not decided by property or any specific measure of
wealth, but by intellectual ability (Mill 2010, 158). So in terms of equality of offices
and opportunity, wealth in itself doesn’t seem to be a necessary factor for Mill,
theoretically speaking, though in practice in the United States today, and certainly in
the Europe in which Mill was writing, lack of wealth can be prohibitive in the ability
of one to develop intellectual abilities to Mill’s standard.
Mill’s concern for equality is apparent in some of his writing such as when he
discusses the problems of paternalism, including societal ideas about the alleged
care and protection exercised by husbands over wives and the rich over the poor
(Mill 1848, IV.7.4-IV.7.8). There appears to be an implicit qualification in his
assessment in that he doesn’t necessarily seem to see a problem always and
everywhere of paternalism, but that the people who had hitherto been subject to it
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have now evolved and bettered themselves to a point that it is no longer necessary
or even workable. Which seems to be rendering them more “equal,” but it is a
curious definition of “equal” as compared to that of Rousseau or Locke. This notion
of the worker bettering himself is perfectly consistent, however, with Mill’s
commitment to and interpretation of utilitarianism. J.S. Mill’s utilitarianism seeks
the overall greatest happiness, but does not define happiness as pursuit of pleasure
or wealth but as pursuit of “mental cultivation” (Mill 2010, 79-82).
In apparent contradiction to his defense of liberty, he also defends the
possibility of enforced equality for the purpose of freeing a society from the
“iniquities of a state of much inequality of wealth” (Mill 1848, II.1.7-II.1.8). In
defense of communism, Mill speculates that because its aim is equality, any unjust
situations that might arise in the application of it would be minuscule in comparison
with the injustice and inequality in the economic system in existence at the time he
was writing (Mill 1848, II.1.15). JS Mill’s intellectual elitism is visible in all of the
essays examined here, but he also defends a distributive method in a socialist
system that does not compensate workers based on amount accomplished because
some will be stronger or faster or what have you, and those workers who have
already been given more by nature should not also be given more by society (Mill
1848, II.1.19).
Mill’s work can seem less evolutionary and more incoherent on first glance.
Because he never presented a comprehensive political theory, his essays on
individual topics can seem contradictory. But in looking at the essays On Liberty, On
Representative Government and The Principles of Political Economy more closely, it
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seems possible that J.S. Mill wasn’t so much confused as he was focused on the topic
at hand. So that one work doesn’t necessarily contradict the other if we consider the
possibility that his purpose in On Liberty was simply to defend liberty, not to
examine the natural problems that arise from the practical application of say, The
Harm Principle. It’s possible that he might say his “socialist” views complement his
“libertarian” views by introducing some of the principles that mitigate the
problematic effects of individual liberty (Mill 1848, 9). Alternatively, he might say
that a cooperative method of production and distribution, including collective
ownership of the means of production (assuming here the liberal view of the state
as representing and carrying out the people’s will), should not necessarily infringe
upon anyone’s individual liberty (Mill 2010, 135). This concept is fitting to Mill in a
way it’s not for Constant and most other early liberal thinkers, as freedom from
tyranny is implied in the liberal notion of liberty, but beyond that, for Mill it is most
importantly defined as intellectual freedom, whereas for Constant (echoing Locke) it
was principally understood as freedom to pursue individual wealth. It does fit well
with John Rawls’ conception of civil society as a “fair system of social cooperation,”
though Rawls neither promoted nor prohibited any particular economic system – he
seems to presume capitalism or some derivative thereof (Rawls 2001, 61 & 71).
Ultimately for Mill, while he is more concerned with the problem of equality than
Constant, anytime he concedes some bit of sacrifice of liberty for its sake, he seems
to view that as perhaps necessary, but not ideal.
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Isaiah Berlin Sees Economic Inequality as Problematic for Liberty
Like Constant and Mill, Isaiah Berlin focused a great deal of his work on the
concept of liberty – with particular concern for freedom from oppressive
governments. Berlin, however, was situated in a time in which liberal political
associations had long become the status quo and subsequently failed in some ways
to meet the needs of the population, opening the door for the rise of fascism and
communism and their attendant assault on the concepts of liberty and equality
(Berlin 2002, 69 & 77). He had the perspective Constant lacked in that he could see
the unintentional inequality that is the natural outcome of unrestricted individual
liberty (Berlin 2002, 65). Further, it had come to be the reality that Constant had
not considered, that as Berlin remarked, “political liberty is useless without the
economic strength to use it” (Berlin 2002, 80).
While most concerned with liberty, Berlin does grapple with the issue that
the realization of the liberal ideal of individual rights can (and does) yield economic
injustice (Berlin 2002, 85). Berlin did not embrace socialism, perhaps in part due to
his aversion to bureaucracies which are necessary to administer a socialist
economic system or perhaps due to its tendency to be conflated with Communism,
which Berlin viewed as oppressive, but most likely it was his concern for the impact
socialism may have on individual liberty (Berlin 2002, 85 & 228). Berlin also
recognized the inherent goodness in a desire to protect equality, but sounding like
John Stuart Mill, simultaneously lamented the bureaucratic state’s infringement
upon liberty to accomplish that (Berlin 2002, 91). He was concerned with a
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minimum standard of welfare – which should not be confused with equality – but
remained devoted to freedom to pursue one’s interests above all else (Berlin 2002,
92 & 93).
In light of his concern for totalitarianism, it follows that liberty might be
Berlin’s overriding concern. Still, it is interesting to note that while Berlin does
concern himself somewhat with economic inequality, and he does lament the rise of
fascism – he doesn’t seem to consider a possible connection between the economic
discontent of the masses and Hitler’s successful pursuit of oppressive power. He
seems rather to view economic inequality as problematic only because it limits the
choices and opportunities of individuals, not as a greater social ill that might help
create the conditions under which despotism might flourish. On the other hand,
Berlin appreciated the welfare capitalism that emerged in the United States as the
result of the New Deal, praising it as a “great liberal compromise… between
individual liberty and economic security” (Berlin 2002, 84).
Berlin is all over the proverbial map in some ways, even seeming to espouse
multiculturalism when he addressed equality apart from equality of liberty and legal
rights – in his discussion on paternalism, he addresses equality as a fundamental
recognition of individual and minority group autonomy and ability to direct their
own lives – not just merely leaving them alone to live as they wish, but respecting,
not just their legal rights but their unique ability as well (Berlin 2002, 201-202).
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John Rawls’ Construction of a Liberal Egalitarian Societal Structure
Of the philosophers considered in this section, the work of John Rawls
embodies a clear and definitive shift toward which Berlin seemed sympathetic, but
not necessarily committed to, and that is the indispensability of equality in liberal
society, even if it means inhibiting the personal liberty of some. In deference to
liberty, Rawls’ theory allows for economic inequality, but only if the least well off
better their position, and does not allow for political inequality or inequality of
opportunity (Rawls 2001, 42-43). As being evaluated by its commitment to
equality, the theory is sound, but unfortunately, in practice as illustrated previously
in this paper, where there is economic inequality, political inequality and inequality
of opportunity tends to follow.
John Rawls was strongly influenced by Kantian egalitarianism and
constructed his theory of justice “within the framework of a Kantian social contract
theory” (Rawls 2005, 265). It’s not enough, however, for the purpose of this paper
to suggest that Rawls held equality to be an indispensible political value – as liberal
thought is defined as such – all of the liberals considered in this paper, hold equality,
defined as equality of the inherent human dignity of persons, as a matter of
importance. The interesting shift, explored and noted somewhat by Mill and Berlin,
becomes very clear in the work of John Rawls. This is the unequivocal recognition
that equality is more than simply a statement about equality. If people are indeed
equal in dignity, the circumstances into which they are born, should not, in effect,
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render them unequal in terms of opportunity and ability to participate in
government or pursue their particular interests (Rawls 2001, 55 & 124).
Rawls, like Berlin, worried about the effect of economic inequality on
political equality. Whereas Berlin praised the welfare capitalist state that the United
States had become, Rawls recognized that a commitment to a minimum standard of
welfare for all citizens satisfied the concept of giving to all what they deserve by
“virtue of their humanity,” but that it falls short of what they deserve as “free and
equal citizens” (Rawls 2001, 129). He conceived of distributive justice as a system
that fairly regulates distribution over time so that all citizens perceive themselves as
free and equal members of society with equal opportunity regardless of their
natural abilities and so-called “good luck” or lack thereof (Rawls 2001, 130).
Rawls argued that economic inequality can seem unfair in itself when some
have too much while others have too little, but the real problem is that it leaves the
less advantaged susceptible to domination by the more advantaged (Rawls 2001,
130-131). He was concerned with not just the fairness of an individual transaction,
as interests the libertarians, but with the fairness over time. He recognized that due
to changing circumstances, the accumulation of any number of fair trades and
agreements over time can inadvertently erode the initial condition of “free and fair.”
To deal with this Rawls emphasizes the importance of the basic structure’s ability to
maintain “background justice” (Rawls 2005, 264-267). Because fairness is naturally
eroded over time, even through fair transactions, Rawls suggests special institutions
are necessary to regulate this over time – he does not favor a system of overgoverning individual transactions, however. Rather, he presumes a basic structure
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of society that will take care of these things, leaving people more free to pursue their
interests within that framework (Rawls 2005, 267-269).
Rawls’ two principles of justice illustrate a commitment to fairness,
egalitarianism and liberty, but in Rawls’ theory economic liberty does not trump
economic equality, in fact one could argue that liberty is simultaneously subordinate
to and protected by equality. The first principle of justice requires that each person
enjoy equal basic liberties. The second principle, as stated above, allows for social
and economic inequality if there is equality of opportunity to occupy offices and
positions and if the least advantaged benefit from the generated wealth (Rawls
2005, 291). Rawls is concerned with specific liberties but not all, it seems, as he
clarifies: “No priority is assigned to liberty as such, as if the exercise of something
called ‘liberty’ has a preeminent value and is the main if not the sole end of political
and social justice” (Rawls 2005, 291-292). Because he is unwilling to assign
unqualified importance to the open-ended term “liberty” he is in a good position to
assert that economic liberty needn’t operate unrestrained (Rawls 2005, 292). He
further sets himself up in this direction by making a distinction between
“restriction” and “regulation” of basic liberties (Rawls 2005, 295). Rawls doesn’t
use that phraseology to discuss economic pursuits, but the concept could have
rather smoothly made that transition. When addressing specifically the issue of
distributive justice, however, rather than taking it on as something in and of itself,
Rawls assumes that if his basic structure is in place, then distributive justice is
defined as a “pure background procedural justice” (Rawls 2001, 50). Individuals
may act as they wish within the framework and the institutions regulating to ensure
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the distribution of goods is fair and equitable (Rawls 2001, 50). Furthermore the
background institutions are to function in a manner that keeps the inequality of
wealth accumulation allowed by the difference principle from becoming too vast,
thereby jeopardizing equality of opportunity. Inheritance laws and taxes are
examples of the procedures put in place to regulate this over time (Rawls 2001, 51).
According to Rawls’ theory the way to determine if the least well off are
benefitting from an inequality is by following the maximin rule in the initial setting
up of the basic structure. Looking at the maximin rule is an exercise done in the
Original Position, not something that is an ongoing function in a society – it is used
for the purpose of setting up the structure (Rawls 2001, 97-99). What is
unfortunately unaddressed by Rawls is that in choosing the option that has the “best
worst outcome” it is unclear what position the least well off are left in. It wouldn’t
compute with the rest of Rawls’ argument if he presumed it just for the least well off
to continue to be destitute while others became excessively wealthy, but nor does he
address any sort of minimum standard in a very helpful way. He does suggest a
minimum standard that might be accomplished through income transfers, but the
minimum standard is defined as “the long-term prospects of the least favored
extending over future generations” (Rawls 1971, 284-285). As was shown in the
first chapter, even when the bottom quintile achieve some percentage of income
growth, the ratio of what they have gained compared to what the top quintile has
achieved can be so great as to threaten other important elements of Rawls’ social
justice theory. Rawls’ first principle of justice along with the principle of fair
opportunity and the savings principle (which is designed to preserve equality of
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opportunity through generations) all constrain the difference principle. However,
these are all based on a premise that a minimum standard satisfies the goals of
social justice, which this paper does not accept.
He addresses the notion of minimum standards when advocating for a
property-owning democracy as opposed to welfare capitalism – suggesting that
welfare capitalism provides what is minimally required for the purpose of human
dignity and that a property-owning democracy offers the minimum of what is owed
to free and equal citizens in a socially cooperative situation - and hopes that by
following the two principles a consistent “underclass” of disadvantaged people
uninspired to participate in the political process would not develop. His problem
with it is the recognition that meeting minimum standards does not promote
equality (Rawls 2001, 129-131, 138-140). One example that illustrates this
dilemma is in 1984 when Ronald Reagan invited voters to re-elect him if they felt
they were better off than they’d been 4 years prior. Just because average Americans
felt better off than they’d been during the stagflation of the 1970s, does not mean
that the policies enacted that facilitated a redistribution of income growth and
wealth accumulation to the very few at the top of the wealth scale was a sound
policy worthy of continued endorsement (Shapiro 2003, 117).
Rawls does address inequality in terms of moral desert. He posits that no
one deserves any good (or bad) fortune obtained by virtue of birth. And he wants to
replace the moral desert framework of distributive justice with a concept of
legitimate expectations and entitlements. He presumes that doing so must
somehow address what he calls the “most serious of inequalities” which is that of
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“prospects” and argues that inequalities of prospects are most likely to be related to
the level of wealth into which one is born (Rawls 2001, 77). If prospects are largely
determined by the level of wealth into which one is born then the policy of
inheritance should be troubling to Rawls, but he considers it permissible “provided
that the resulting inequalities are to the advantage of the least fortunate and
compatible with liberty and fair equality of opportunity’ (Rawls 1971, 278). One can
only guess how the advantaged (those with enhanced prospects due to being born
into wealth) having the ability to inherit wealth could possibly benefit the already
least advantaged who will never inherit anything. Rawls attempts to remedy this by
advocating for a progressive inheritance tax, which he might argue is then put in the
public pool to fund programs that support the least advantaged, but it’s difficult to
argue that this system leaves the least advantaged better off than if the entire
amount was not inheritable to one or a few individuals, even after being taxed
(Rawls 1971, 279). If justice is fairness, there are few phenomena less “fair” than
wealth by inheritance. And Rawls acknowledges that when inequalities of wealth
become too great, equality of opportunity is threatened, but his reliance on taxation
to keep this gap from becoming too great is problematic because as stated above,
inheritance, in and of itself, does not meet the criteria of the difference principle
(Rawls 1971, 278).
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Post-Rawls Liberals and the Pressing Concern of Economic Inequality
Economic inequality and the problems it poses for the core values of
liberalism have increasingly been the focus of liberal thought. Several
contemporary liberals have specifically built upon the work of John Rawls. Brian
Barry, for instance, specifically used Rawls’ basic structure in his work examining
economic inequality and injustice, attempting to address the problem Rawls’
maximin principle poses for economic equality over time. While Will Kymlicka
largely addresses the issues posed by communitarians and multiculturalists, he also
acknowledges economic discussions within liberalism. Kymlicka expresses a
concern for marginalized groups by questioning the traditional liberal acceptance of
welfare capitalism – including the fundamental injustice of reliance upon a growth
economy, which the difference principle also does – and points out that Rawls’
difference principle might best work under a market socialism system (Kymlicka
1989, 90-91). This would address the concern posed above in that when choosing
the “best worst outcome” a minimal standard of material goods would be presumed.
Rawls had found welfare capitalism problematic as well, stating that it did not
“realize all the main political values expressed by the two principles of justice”
(Rawls 2001, 135). Kymlicka also holds up John Stuart Mill’s comfort with socialism
as evidence that socialism is perfectly compatible with liberalism. Further he points
to Dworkin’s auction scheme as perhaps a more egalitarian system (Kymlicka 1989,
91). His egalitarian concern in this discussion is not based on class issues so much
as gender inequality, which he, unlike liberals in years past, recognizes to have a
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strong economic component. He posits that to state women are autonomous beings
is well and good, but without economic resources they are not free to direct their
lives independently (Kymlicka 1989, 89-93). In all cases he concludes that some
sort of economic equalizing system is a necessary concern for liberalism. While he
defends Rawls and Dworkin, he also calls them to task for not addressing the
“entrenched inequalities of class and gender,” presuming their theories don’t
endorse this condition, and wondering why they failed to question it (Kymlicka
1989, 111).

The Ethics Based Approach of Ronald Dworkin
Ronald Dworkin argues that with regard to equality, “dignity requires equal
concern for the fate of all and full respect for personal responsibility” (Dworkin
2011, 338). He pictures liberty and equality not just as compatible values, but as
intertwined (Dworkin 2011, 331). Putting aside Dworkin’s curious premise that the
reason left-of-center politicians struggle to obtain incremental gains for those at the
bottom of the economic scale is because politicians can’t ask for more than “the
majority are willing to give,” it is useful to consider his analysis of equality and
economic policies that appear to exist for the sake of liberty4 (Dworkin 2011, 351).
He begins by positing there is value in “troubling the comfortable” with the issue of
poverty, because in the present time “their selfishness impairs the legitimacy of the
His argument is ambiguous on this count and therefore can’t be analyzed very effectively, but
clearly the majority of people are not at the top of the economic scale. Even as this statement of his
doesn’t appear to be factual unless his meaning is simply unclear, the argument that proceeds from it
is sound.
4
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politics that makes them comfortable,” and we must not also let them think they are
justified in their positions (Dworkin 2011, 351). He argues that those in a political
community should be equal in material resources as a start, because without that
individuals do not have the liberty to pursue what makes them happy. He
acknowledges that some people may choose to pursue poetry rather than something
that commands a higher price in the market and therefore exact economic equality
is undesirable at best (Dworkin 2011, 355). Dworkin’s focus on liberty is that
individual liberty is a necessary component of treating citizens with equal concern
and further that liberty and equality are mutually affirming, “not independent
virtues but aspects of the same ideal of political association,” (Dworkin 2000, 181182).

Conclusion
In the United States, of which Rawls was a product – if not everywhere – the
problem of economic inequality cannot be divorced from political inequality and
inequality of opportunity. Constant hadn’t seen the problems posed by economic
inequality, assuming that liberty would leave people free to pursue their private
interests, leaving everyone better off. Mill seemed to be concerned with this point,
but more as a moralist and humanitarian. Berlin’s primary concern regarding
equality was the manner in which lack of economic resources acts, in effect, to
restrict the liberty of individuals to direct their own lives. Rawls, in contrast to all,
views equality of opportunity – and if not equality in distribution of resources, at
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least equality of protections under the institutions that govern the distribution of
resources – as important in and of themselves. Perhaps as an American living in the
middle and late part of the twentieth century, he simply took liberty for granted in a
way the other three were not able to do, and so was inclined to not be unconcerned
about it, but to not see it as the most pressing political problem of his time and
place.
At liberalism’s inception, it could not have been known how precarious the
balance between liberty and equality would become or how various economic
systems might promote one over the other. The injustice that economic inequality
inhibits the individual liberty of some to direct their own lives combined with the
quandary that the prevention of economic inequality inhibits the individual liberty
of others to pursue their economic interests is a critical contemporary problem that
liberal political theory may not be equipped to reconcile and may require at least
some elements of a more communitarian approach that recognizes the
interdependency of humans - such as that proposed by Michael Walzer, which will
be explored in the following chapter.
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Chapter 3
That political equality and equality of opportunity is necessary for a just society is
undisputed
In Chapter 3 the views of contemporary theorist from liberal,
communitarian and to a small extent multiculturalist camps are
examined with regard to the importance placed on economic
equality. First we establish that all of the social justice theories
considered for this paper agree that economic inequality matters
insofar at it affects political equality and equality of opportunity.
Then the various ways theorists deal with balancing or
constraining economic inequality is examined. These are then built
upon for the final chapter of this paper in which constraints,
conditions and methods for correcting economic injustice are
explored.

Introduction
The purpose of this chapter will be to examine the issue of economic
inequality insofar as it poses a problem for the concept of social justice in a
pluralistic society. The exploration presumes that mechanisms designed to promote
social justice are, and/or should be, intrinsic to the structures and institutions
governing civil society.
Relying upon John Rawls and theorists who have built upon or reacted
against his work, this chapter is directed at evaluating the assumption inherent in
these theories that vast inequalities of wealth can exist in a just society. Rawls
allows for this if his “difference principle” is satisfied, Michael Walzer allows for this
as long as basic human needs are met, Robert Nozick allows for this if the wealth
was obtained legally, while Iris Marion Young asserts that the issue is not the
overriding problem for the achievement of a just society in any event.
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Relying heavily upon the work of Brian Barry and Ronald Dworkin, this
chapter will attempt to illustrate that, whether or not money ought to be able to
purchase political power and opportunity, it does do so. And looking back to the
original contract theorist, Rousseau will illuminate the injustice of economic
disparity in a contract-based society. In conclusion it aims to propose that a theory
of justice must address this fundamental social phenomenon if it is to be politically
useful.

John Rawls’ Liberal Theory of Justice
John Rawls’ theory of justice reflects a classical liberal approach with regard
for autonomy, liberty and equality being upheld as the highest values. His theory is
contract based and presumes that the purpose of establishing a system of justice is
to ensure that the responsibilities and goods necessary and available to a social
group are fairly distributed (Rawls 2001, 7.). The difference principle arises from
Rawls’ commitment to egalitarianism, allowing for disparate accumulations of
wealth but only if the accumulation occurs on a level playing field where no one was
arbitrarily advantaged via natural talent, birthright, etcetera (Sandel 2009, 156).
Rawls’ Two Principles of Justice first set up the basic structure of society
which ensures basic political equality and liberty for all but allows for economic
inequality so long as equality of opportunity governs the ability of all to hold offices
and positions, and so long as the least well off members of society benefit from any
inequality of wealth generated. The latter part is known as the difference principle,
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Rawls’ primary answer to the problems posited by the vast inequalities of wealth
that appear to occur in such a system (Rawls 2001, 42-43).
Rawls is sensitive to the limitations on the problems the difference principle
is able (or not able) to address. His answer to that is that the difference principle
can only be applied after the first two principles of equal liberties and equal
opportunity are firmly in place (Rawls 2001, 43). As a theory in the mythical
original position, which Rawls constructs, this could be an adequate explanation.
However, if the goal is to ensure social justice in civil society, Rawls must answer to
the fact that economic inequality creates, legitimates and perpetuates political
inequality and inequality of opportunity – if not in all civil societies, certainly in
capitalist, welfare capitalist and property-owning democratic societies (Rawls 2001,
135-136). Even if all are eligible to hold offices and positions of power, where vast
economic disparity exists humans are placed in an unequal bargaining position
when competing for and/or negotiating participation in them – Rousseau’s Social
Contract, which Rawls builds upon, as well as his Discourse on Political Economy
both anticipate this quandary for social justice theory.
As Rousseau illustrates the person in possession of vast wealth commands a
privilege in society that a poor person does not. And further the wealthy person has
advantages offered him by cooperating in civil society that are not known to the
poor person (Rousseau 1913, 160-161). Rousseau asks, “Are not all the advantages
of society for the rich and powerful?” and laments that “all this respect costs him
nothing,” in contrast to the poor who, “if ever he obtains justice, it is with much
greater difficulty than others obtain favors” (Rousseau 1913, 160-161). Following
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this it is difficult to defend a theory of social justice that doesn’t account for the ease
with which the wealthy continue to get wealthier and the continual struggle that it is
for everyone else to survive. It is not new that “nothing comes out of nothing” – that
it is more difficult to accumulate money starting from zero than it is starting from
even a modest fortune (Rousseau 1913, 162). This truism is readily recognized in
pop culture as well. During a 1978 Saturday Night Live monologue Steve Martin
joked that he knew how to become a millionaire and avoid paying taxes, “First get a
million dollars...”
Rawls does propose that if the basic political structure is functioning then
specific issues of distributive justice should be able to be decided fairly by the
institutions already in place, such as courts (Rawls 2001, 49). For Rawls
distributive justice assumes social reciprocity in that resources are not just allocated
but that they are in a sense earned through social cooperation (Rawls 2001, 51).
But how does one obtain a position on said courts and what of the issue of unequal
bargaining positions? In a capitalist system the rich need the labor of the poor every
bit as much as the poor need the money offered by the rich in exchange for labor,
but the reward of the work done by each is nowhere near equal. This is problematic
for Rousseau who suggests that the point of giving up certain freedoms to live
cooperatively is because everyone benefits from the cooperation of the rest
(Rousseau 1913, 195). According to Rousseau natural law suggests everyone has a
right to everything he needs and no right to occupy more land than he needs for
himself – he further claims that one can only maintain a sizeable amount of property
by force because “all others are being robbed” of their habitat “which nature gave
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them in common” (Rousseau 1913, 197). Rawls’ commitment to equality in the
original position is a good start, but as Rousseau points out, given that inequality of
strength and intelligence exists in nature, any justice theory that relies on social
contract theory will insist on laws that enforce equality by legal right. As laws
generally are designed to protect those that have something to lose from those who
do not, Rousseau also suggests that civil association is only advantageous “when all
have something and none too much” (Rousseau 1913, 199).
According to Rousseau there is a universal justice that emanates from God as
well as from reason alone, but a just outcome depends upon mutual observance and
only the just will observe those natural rights, leaving the “wicked” to benefit.
Because of this, laws are needed to “join rights to duties” (Rousseau 1913, 210).
Among those laws Rousseau suggests is that the existence of both very rich and very
poor people are detrimental to the common good. He doesn’t appear to view this as
so much a problem for justice, but as a threat to liberty and stability, as he points out
that when some men are rich enough to buy others and others so poor they have to
sell themselves, the door is opened to tyranny and otherwise destruction of the state
(Rousseau 1913, 225-127).
Rawls sets out the notion of a property-owning democracy as a way of
structuring society that would prevent vast inequalities of wealth accumulation
because it would distribute ownership of the means of production in a more equal
fashion and proposes it implies a constitutional democracy that will protect the
liberties and equality of opportunity without regard to possession of wealth (Rawls
2001, 145). The problem again is that while constitutional governments may in
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theory protect all citizens, those who can purchase rights, opportunities and power
are still able to do so over those who cannot, a sound theory has to recognize this.
There doesn’t appear to be a good answer to this in Rawls’ theory, though he does
suggest that the basic structure and a property-owning democracy would by
definition have procedures in place that would keep the distributions of wealth from
becoming extremely disparate through functions like inheritance laws and taxes
(Rawls 2001, 51). Still the fundamental problem with the difference principle
remains - that is, if one person is permitted to accumulate unlimited wealth with the
only caveat that the least well off becomes even just slightly better off, the door has
opened for grossly uneven distributions of material wealth.
The idea behind the difference principle is it should not establish more
attractive prospects for the already advantaged unless doing so also advantages the
least well off, and social cooperation should be mutually advantageous (Rawls 1971,
75 & 77). However, Rawls accepts as a given that there will be social classes and
some will start out with better prospects than others and states this is just if “the
difference in expectation is to the advantage of the representative man who is worse
off…” suggesting that in some cases lowering the expectation of the more
advantaged may also be detrimental to the lesser advantaged (Rawls 1971, 78). Just
as with “trickle down economics” Rawls suggests that the entrepreneurial class
provides opportunities and such for the laboring class, thereby allowing their
privilege to benefit the less privileged, and that something along these lines must be
true in order to justify these inequalities (Rawls 1971, 78). This is confusing in light
of his commitment to open offices and institutions. What good is it that offices are
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open to all, if only some are afforded the opportunity to acquire the skills and
education necessary to be hired or elected to them?
In light of the current state of dramatic income inequality and the limitations
that has placed on equality of opportunity, Rawls’ defense of the difference principle
offers a caveat:
“How unjust an arrangement is depends on how excessive the
higher expectations are and to what extent they depend upon
the violation of the other principles of justice, for example,
fair equality of opportunity;” (Rawls 1971, 79)
In this statement Rawls concedes that excessive inequality produced under the
constraints of the difference principle can produce conditions in which his basic
principles of justice are violated. He goes on to acknowledge that the larger the
difference between rich and poor the more likely the poor are left worse off, thus
violating the principles of mutual advantage and democratic equality (Rawls 1971,
79). So in that instance the requirements of the difference principle are not met, but
even when the requirements are met, initial inequality is still a given:
“…each man’s position is improved with respect to the initial
arrangement of equality. But it is clear that nothing depends
upon being able to identify this initial arrangement; indeed,
how well off men are in this situation plays no essential role
in applying the difference principle” (Rawls 1971, 80).

So the requirements of the application of the difference principle in any
particular instance should constrain a tremendous inequality of gain by each party
in that instance, but it does not address or constrain cumulative inequality over
time. Furthermore it ignores the caveat of Rousseau that relative equality matters –
that differentials in economic standards can allow some (or one) to exert excessive
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power over another (or many). An example in which the difference principle is
satisfied, but the conditions produced are objectively unjust is sweatshops – the
theory behind the good of sweatshops is in keeping with Rawls’ idea that “within
just social arrangements something like a general diffusion of gains does take place,
at least in the longer run” (Rawls 1971, 82).
A modern day global example of this problem is the way in which American
corporations exploit the labor pool in the developing world. The extremely wealthy
corporations attempt to justify the low wages and inhumane working conditions
they benefit from by suggesting that the employees are at least better off financially
than they had been without jobs. Historically, economically and empirically this
may be an accurate statement, but it doesn’t follow that this is enough to satisfy the
principles required for social justice (Rivoli 2005, 105-119). When group A controls
resources that are necessary for the survival of group B, and can therefore threaten
the group B’s basic interests, the balance of power relations is upset according to Ian
Shapiro’s definition of domination (Shapiro 2003, 4). Those who are in a desperate
situation are not in an adequate bargaining position and therefore do not receive
the true value of their labor. This is a problem even for libertarian theorist Robert
Nozick, whose theory of distributive justice will be critiqued more thoroughly in a
later section.
In a contract-based society where people are left free to pursue their
economic interests via entering into freely negotiated agreements, vast inequality of
wealth is a problem. According to Nozick – “equal rights” includes the liberty to
enter into contracts, and therefore whatever economic result appears is deemed to
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be fair. But contractual relationships are not necessarily contracts negotiated
among equals – this is particularly true when there is an inequality of economic
need. If one party is in desperate need of the negotiated item and the other party is
not, there is not effectively a negotiation going on. More than several historical
dramas illustrate this fact, among them the case of Lochner v New York in which
Lochner, a bakery owner, challenged a law mandating employees not be allowed to
work more than 60 hours per week on the grounds that it interfered with his right
to contract. Not surprisingly Lochner was able to find an abundance of employees
willing to work more than 10 hours in a day if that’s what they needed to do to have
a job, whether that comported with the best interest of their health and safety or
not. They were not in a position to negotiate their work hours at all. Furthermore, if
“taxation of earnings from labor is on par with forced labor” as Nozick asserts, how
does the entering into contractual relationship among non-equals not equate to
forced labor? (Nozick 1974, 169). The collection of taxes is an important point for
the purpose of contract negotiations among people in unequal bargaining positions.
Tax money is used, theoretically and in part, to maintain various things that
contribute to the common good - among them, labor laws that protect those who are
in an unequal wage-bargaining position.

Michael Walzer’s Communitarian Response to Rawls
In contrast to Rawls’ traditional liberal account of social justice principles,
Michael Walzer bases his idea of social justice on a communitarian notion of
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“complex equality” in which wealth is simply one social good among many and its
value is dependent upon the relationship of those members of a given community.
In his vision of a just society, having a great amount of wealth does not translate into
the ability to purchase other social goods such as political power, educational
opportunity and the like (Walzer 1983, 10).
In Walzer’s assessment politics is the route taken to power, which then
allows one person or group to dominate some social good or other (Walzer 1983,
15). Of course this can also work in the reverse – that the possessor of excess
wealth can buy political power. Walzer acknowledges in many places that money
should not operate “outside its sphere” such as when he remarks on a story about
George Orwell’s school experience that it is a “perfect illustration of the tyranny of
wealth and class over learning” (Walzer 1983, 212). He is well aware that money
oversteps the sphere in which he would like it to stay, but stops short of suggesting
that artificially equalizing wealth at least to a certain degree might be a necessary
ingredient for a social justice theory (Walzer 1983, 12).
Walzer creates a list of the things money can’t buy, not asserting that it
doesn’t buy those things but that if (and when) it does, it is an unjust transaction
(Walzer 1983, 100-103). And while his list is thorough and accurate, money does
unfortunately buy many of the things on it – this is the fact that is most troubling
and important in the development of a social justice theory. Walzer might counter
that all we owe to each other as citizens is what basic human dignity requires (ie the
necessities), but while he didn’t address the issue of whether excessively large
wealth gaps may be unjust by definition, artificially regulating how large that gap
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should be allowed to be could still be compatible with his overall theory that money
should only be able to rule within its sphere. Walzer asserts, “political power
(rather than the means of production) is probably the most important, and certainly
the most dangerous, good in human history” (Walzer 1983, 15). But it seems clear
that in the United States those who own the means of production are at a particular
advantage in terms of political power, suggesting that the way to equalize political
power is to equalize economic standing.
Walzer is sensitive to vastly unequal distributions of wealth but his only
solution is to propose a form of welfare capitalism or socialism in which everyone in
society has their basic needs met and from there, a “surplus” of wealth can be
distributed however it happens (Walzer 1983, 75-76).
“Hungry men and women don’t have to stage a
performance, or pass an exam, or win an election”
(Walzer 1983, 75).

His commitment to meeting the basic needs of fellow citizens is certainly more clear
than that of Rawls, but it still fails to address that those who possess the surplus are
not only going to be buying extra trinkets and doodads but also better education,
better positions and greater political power – whether money “ought” to be able to
purchase these types of goods or not (Walzer 1983, 22). And therefore we cannot
conceptualize a theory of social justice without including some sort of wealth
equalizing mechanism. Following Rousseau Walzer argues,
“Men and women who appropriate vast sums of money
for themselves, while needs are still unmet, act like
tyrants, dominating and distorting the distribution of
security and welfare" (Walzer 1983, 76).
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As addressed previously, limiting people’s ability to do this should not be viewed as
an infringement on individual liberty as some, such as Nozick, want to suggest,
precisely because wealth is only obtainable and meaningful within civil society, and
there is nothing oppressive about recognizing that everyone’s labor and
consumption habits are necessary to perpetuating the market economy.
Robert Nozick and the Libertarian Theory of Justice
For Robert Nozick, you rightly have what you rightly acquire or what
someone has chosen to give you from his/her rightful acquisitions (Nozick 1974,
160). This is based upon John Locke’s State of Nature theory in which all that you
have put your labor into is rightfully yours and supposedly individuals have rights,
even if they are not enforceable. This is the problem with state of nature theory – it
may be well and good to suggest that there is some set of divine rights that people
ought to have, but without a cooperative community that acknowledges those
rights, people do not practically have any rights at all. Therefore to create a social
justice theory that presumes one person’s privilege doesn’t to some degree depend
upon the recognition of others in the community that that privilege is deserved, is to
ignore the degree to which everyone’s relative success is dependent upon the
community in which they live.
Nozick argues that, “No distributional patterned principle of justice can be
continuously realized without continuous interference with people’s lives” (Nozick
1974, 163). This is a fair and accurate statement, but politics and political systems
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are by their nature an interference with people’s lives. If politics is the way to
address social problems, it necessarily follows that it will interfere in people’s lives –
presumably for the good of all the people who are subject to it. Nozick is in favor of
the state interfering in say a hungry person’s attempt to meet his needs by “stealing”
bread from someone who has managed to accumulate an excess of bread. But
should the state intervene to suggest that the person who has accumulated too
much bread is effectively “stealing” from those who need it and who are not any less
deserving of it, this is an injustice, according to Nozick. History shows us that
tremendous policing by the state is necessary to protect the wealthy few from the
desperate masses – a state committed to social justice should likewise protect the
masses from exploitation by the wealthy few. If a minimal state is justifiable to
protect the physically weaker possessor of an object from a physically stronger
person who is capable of taking it from him, then why is it not justifiable for the
state to protect the dumb from being exploited, or tricked or simply outwitted by
the smart or the disadvantaged by birth from the advantaged by birth?
For Nozick the ability to fairly and freely enter into contracts is of paramount
importance, but his theory doesn’t have an answer to a problematic truism of
negotiation. If two people are negotiating a division of $100, the person most in
need of money will likely receive the least, because he will be most likely to settle
for whatever he can get – if Nozick accepts as just a minimal state to protect the
physically weak owner of a possession from the ability of a physically stronger
person’s ability to take it from him, then it doesn’t follow that it is unjust for a state
to protect the mentally or economically disadvantaged negotiator from the party in
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the strongest position. A Libertarian viewpoint does not have an answer for the
implicit advantage some have in perpetuating and maintaining the status quo and
by definition limiting the opportunities of those who begin less well off over time.
Even if a libertarian would allow resources “legally obtained” to be horded by the
few who are able to horde them simply because they are able – the artificial
equalization of bargaining positions should not be a point of dispute.
Nozick makes a good point that wherever people have access to any
resources, some will use those resources to acquire things they specifically want
and others will squander all that they have – there is no apparent solution to this
(Nozick 1974, 163). Therefore the solution must lie in the protection of equality of
opportunity (both economic and political) for each new generation.
Redistribution of economic resources for Nozick is a violation of people’s
rights (Nozick 1974, 168). In discussing necessary constraints on the state, Nozick
argues that it is absurd to suggest that some persons should have to pay a cost in the
name of the overall social good. He goes on to claim that the person being forced to
pay from what is (allegedly) rightfully his in order to benefit others in the
community is “using” him – that “something is done to him for the sake of others”
and that cloaking this event in the language of “social good” does not make it any
more permissible (Nozick 1974, 33). The problem with Nozick’s argument is that it
leaves out the entire discussion about who this individual “used” in order to
accumulate enough that a society might think he should give some of it back for the
common good. If, for example, this individual found ten hungry people who were
willing to work for him at minimal wages, could we not say he “used” them? If the
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government guaranteed a loan so he could start a business, has he not “used” the
people who support and make up that government? Nozick might say that he
doesn’t support the sort of government that exists in the United States today, in that
it subsidizes corporations and guarantees loans and such, but even if we peel back
the layers of that and attempt a bare bones government as Nozick suggests, it is not
possible for an individual to accumulate excessive wealth without the help of
anyone else – there are workers and investors, there are natural resources and land
used in most cases, there is a government whose policies allow the use of those
resources and protect the accumulated wealth, there is a social compact in place
that agrees upon what is valuable and what is not. These sorts of cooperative
agreements do not suggest that it is ok for the few who amass great wealth under
this system to then use their collective power to enact governmental policies that
diminish the economic opportunities available to others.

Michael Sandel’s Communitarian Analysis of the Libertarian Theory of Justice
Michael Sandel offers some insight into the problems surrounding the
justness or lack thereof of inordinate inequalities of wealth through a thoughtful
analysis of the libertarian view of justice and is critical, in particular, of that view as
presented by Robert Nozick (Sandel 2009, 62-72). Sandel’s communitarian
approach offers a much more realistic portrait of why civil society develops and
what people both gain and lose for the sake of being part of it than does Rawls’
liberal view of civil society in which the individual precedes his social structure.
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For Robert Nozick individual rights reign supreme and the only just state is a
minimal one functioning solely to protect those individual rights and enforce
contracts (Sandel 2009, 62). The most glaring shortcoming of this view is that it
ignores that “rights” do not precede the governments that uphold them and
therefore there is implicit responsibility on the part of the individual to also support
the state and the other members that make up society from which individuals
benefit.
For Nozick vast inequalities of wealth are justified if the wealth was
accumulated using one’s own resources and via free market exchange – assuming
those conditions are satisfied it is unjust to redistribute excessive resources (Sandel
2009, 63). To think these conditions could exist (or at least that they routinely
exist) is to ignore the ways in which vast wealth accumulates – generally through a
corporation and/or government appropriating some physical resource and creating
a condition in which the people living in the immediate vicinity of that physical
resource can no longer sustain themselves without working for that
corporation/government. The people in the immediate vicinity of this are then
dependent on that entity for their survival. To pretend that those people are in a
fair bargaining position with the holders of the income-producing asset is an
injustice to those people. Furthermore the wealth accumulated by having the
power, the knowledge and the means to orchestrate that condition ought not just
benefit those few who were privileged enough to create the condition. They are no
more entitled to a disproportionate sum of the fruits of the laborers they conquered
than are the laborers themselves.
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Both Nozick and Sandel, however, muddy the issue by focusing on an
individual’s wealth attained by some highly valued skill in a society’s time and place
such as that of Wilt Chamberlin and Michael Jordan respectively (Sandel 2009, 6466). The issue is slightly more complex when viewed as such because one could
make the case that Michael Jordan didn’t harm anyone in earning his money, nor did
he force anyone to purchase tickets to his basketball games and therefore his
resources now belong to him alone. However, Michael Jordan didn’t materialize in a
vacuum; he has been able to achieve what he has achieved because of the political
and economic structure of the country in which he lives, which is made up of a
citizenry that has nurtured him along the way. Michael Jordan might not have
grown up to be a basketball star if he’d been chained to a loom in Bangladesh from
the time he was four years old, for instance. Nozick might reply that Michael Jordan
is still rightfully entitled to his earnings based upon his view of cooperation.
In short, the Libertarian justification for allowing vast inequalities of wealth
ultimately rests on a notion that people have a right to all that they accumulate by
virtue of their own labor (Sandel 2009, 68-72). But there is no such thing as a
“right” without either a government to enforce and uphold that right or a
community that is in agreement with respecting that right or both. In theory one
can embrace the notion of natural or God-given rights but in practice there has to be
agreement about what that entails. The notion of rights implies relationship and as
Iris Marion Young points out, “Rights are not fruitfully conceived as possessions”
(Young1990, 25). Because of this rights imply a kind of reciprocity and a theory of
social justice must address how the stronger, more talented, luckier and what have
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you benefit from the weaker, less talented, less lucky and so on. Even if this were
deemed just, the vast inequalities of resource distribution subsequently set up an
environment in which those lucky few are even better able to at best benefit from
and at worst exploit those unlucky many.
Rawls is sensitive to this and asserts that justice requires social institutions
such as taxes and inheritance laws to ensure that fundamental individual liberty and
equality are not compromised over time by equaling out somewhat how much can
be accumulated (Rawls 2001, 161). Young also addresses this by pointing out that
it’s helpful to look at patterns of distribution over time, as simply looking at an
instance of distribution does not offer enough information for determining its
fairness – one also needs to analyze how the distribution came about – in other
words, that the process of distribution is as important as the product (Young 1990,
29-30).

Iris Marion Young’s Criticism of Traditional Distributive Justice Arguments and the
Limitations of Identity Politics in the Articulation of Social Justice Theory
Not everyone agrees that distributive justice is the most fundamental and
important factor for social justice. Iris Marion Young employs the critical theory
tradition in criticizing the tendency to focus on distributive justice as missing the
more important issue, which in her view is institutionalized prejudices – in other
words the ways in which racism, sexism, homophobia, etcetera are intrinsic to and
legitimated by the institutions of civil society (Young 1990, 15). “Domination and
oppression,” in her words, are an overlooked cause of social injustice and while she
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accepts that distribution of resources is important she rejects that it is the
fundamental issue on which other ideals of equal power and opportunity hinge
(Young 1990, 15-17). She does not deny that distribution of resources and material
goods is important, but that the structures in place that determine how those
distributions take place are the primary concern for an adequate theory of social
justice.
Young’s position takes on a fairly idealistic and utopian tone similar to that of
Walzer in that she at once acknowledges and dismisses that higher incomes tend to
buy better positions and more decision-making power by basically saying this
“shouldn’t” be the case (Young 1990, 19). But if it is the case, how can one construct
a theory of social justice without addressing it?
Young rightfully wants to question both the justness of distribution and the
justness of the decision-making structures and institutions that determine
distribution (Young 1990, 22). But she also wants to engage, like Walzer, in “the
naming of the goods, the giving of meaning, and the collective making,” which may
be an interesting exercise, but fantasizing about what money ought not buy and
what spheres of life it ought not rule is not very helpful in the creation of just
systems and institutions (Young 1990, 22). Certainly it is more productive to
acknowledge what money does buy and what spheres of life it does rule in
considering what basic structures and systems should be in place to see that it may
not overstep its bounds. Clearly, in theory as well as practice the answer includes
some sort of equalizing mechanism.
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Young wants to say that opportunities are not an issue of distributive justice
because whether or not there is justice of opportunity is not dependent upon
distributive outcome but upon the social structures that allow for or inhibit
opportunity (Young 1990, 26). But this is to ignore that even when institutions are
structured in a way to theoretically honor equality of opportunity, those with
excessive wealth are able to purchase opportunity and those without are not.
Young’s difference politics fails in an important regard. She demonstrates
the recognition that oppression based on race is deeply rooted in capitalist
structure. Even rightly stating, “Racism, like sexism, is a convenient means of
dividing workers from one another and legitimating the superexploitation and
marginalization of some” (Young 1990, 122). The problem with her argument is
that if she carried it through to its logical conclusion she would find that the issue at
hand is class discrimination, with racism being a handy way of dividing loyalties
among the underclass for those in positions of economic privilege who seek to
maintain the status quo. Young is not wrong that racism exists or that it’s an
instrument of oppression, but her argument doesn’t acknowledge that an African
American like Michael Jordan may have lame jokes made about him by
unenlightened racist people, but he is not vulnerable to the abuse, exploitation and
oppression that, for example, an uneducated African American gas station attendant
in the inner-city is. Racism is unpleasant but it is hard to place as the primary
instrument of oppression in capitalist society. Capitalism exists and thrives in both
racially diverse and homogenous environments (ie. US, Norway, Japan, England,
Singapore).
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One might argue against this by pointing out that economic upward mobility
is more challenging for some due to racism, sexism and the like – this is a valid
criticism of the argument in this paper that could be made by feminist and
multiculturalism theorists. It appears to be true that a poor and uneducated white
man in the United States may have an easier time of transcending his background
than white women and all people of color. It is beyond the scope of this paper to
address that issue, but even if it is likely to be true, the argument that all people in
capitalist society, regardless of race and gender, have greater access to education,
opportunity and political power if they are born into or manage to accumulate
excessive wealth is still valid. Therefore a theory concerned with social justice must
include a means for preventing vast inequalities of wealth. As pointed out at the
beginning of this paper, race and gender do still seem to impact the likelihood of
being at the bottom of the economic barrel in the United States, but that fact
strengthens the argument here that if wealth were redistributed according to class,
not race, all would be better off. The problem of racism will likely still exist, but on
the other hand, maybe race relations would dramatically improve without economic
hardship, which leads people to look for a scapegoat for their misfortune. Brian
Barry will shed more insight on that issue in the following pages.
Where Rawls, Walzer and Young all seem to agree is that, as Young states, “…
social justice concerns the degree to which a society contains and supports the
institutional conditions necessary for the realization of these values,” where “these
values” are competing definitions of good in a pluralist society (Young 1990, 37).
This is, despite the bristling of Young against liberalism, a decidedly liberal ideal.
65

The problem that all of their analyses fail to resolve, however, is that the degree to
which this can occur is dependent upon the empowerment of all people in a pluralist
society to live their values and those individuals who are on the bottom of the
economic ladder are not afforded the same opportunity and freedom to direct their
lives as are those at the top.

Brian Barry’s Argument that Social Justice Hinges upon Equal Distribution of
Material Goods
Building upon the work of John Rawls and accepting Rawls’ notion of a “basic
structure” created for the purpose of distributing social goods as a fundamentally
good start in the quest for social justice, Brian Barry attempts to tackle the issue of
economic disparity as it relates to social justice, asserting most importantly that
while the creation and maintenance of just institutions is important, the concern of
social justice is the analysis of the outcomes such institutions allow or produce
(Barry 2005, 16-17). The focus of this paper is similarly concerned – if we are
applying a theory to a liberal culture and the theory allows for vast income
inequality, while empirical evidence asserts that vast economic inequality has a
strong correlation with political inequality and inequality of opportunity, then we
have a theoretical dilemma.
Where Young and Walzer assert that self-esteem is independent of economic
standing, Barry recognizes that the “failure” implicit in poverty is demeaning in
itself, whether or not there is racism or anything else attached to it (Barry 2005, 78).
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Barry is sensitive to racism and does see it posing a hindrance to just outcomes, but
more often than not, where there is race discrimination, there is simultaneous class
discrimination. For instance, he illustrates the disproportionate rate at which black
drug offenders are convicted and imprisoned, but not only are they black, they are
assigned public defenders because they are also too poor to purchase legal help.
The criminal justice system is racist, but as Barry mentions for a different purpose,
OJ Simpson was acquitted (Barry 2005, 96-97). Barry doesn’t state this directly, but
African-Americans who have money are treated better by the criminal justice
system then are those who do not.5
Using the privatization of prisons as an example Barry illustrates how the
criminal justice system exploits the poor and benefits the rich. Those who are
benefitting from the privatization of prisons are making money and donating it to
political candidates who enact policies that will serve to imprison even more people.
Meanwhile the victims of these policies have no financial clout and if they have been
in prison they can’t even exercise their fundamental right of citizenship by voting
(Barry 2005, 102-103).
In contrast with drug offenders who tend to operate on the bottom of the
economic scale, Barry shows that wealthy committers of crime involving great theft
and such more often than not go largely unpunished (Barry 2005, 104). Part of the
reason for this is the ability to purchase legal help and another reason Barry
suggests is that the wealthy are looked upon as harder working, better, smarter,
5 The criminal justice issue is beyond the scope of this paper to research or analyze, but an intuitive
and anecdotal argument could be made that the economically advantaged fare better regardless of
race.
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etcetera people than are the poor – the poor are disposable in a capitalist economy,
the wealthy keep things running properly (Barry 2005, 104).
Perhaps the most disturbing outcome of wealth inequality is the variance in
IQ among wealthy and poor children (Barry 2005, 122). Not to lend too much
credence to IQ tests, but as they serve as one measure of basic cognitive ability and
future academic success as culturally defined, it is clear that simply by virtue of
being born into wealth one’s reasoning abilities develop better, if not objectively
speaking, at least better in a manner that predicts success in a particular culture.
Barry shows that the notion of “native intelligence” is unreliable at best. That alone
is enough to prove that economic inequality un-levels the playing field of alleged
equal opportunity, by definition, and it perpetuates a false notion that some people
are born smarter than others without regard to their early socialization (Barry
2005, 135). In sum Barry argues that the meritocratic view of social justice is
erroneous because environment so heavily influences even genetic predisposition –
therefore denying opportunities to some based on a perceived notion of lack of
innate ability is a severe injustice, because without the opportunity there is no way
to know what the level of ability actually could be (Barry 2005, 126-127).
Another prejudice about poor people, particularly in American society, that
Barry discusses is the rags-to-riches ideal – the idea that the hardworking and
responsible can overcome their economic misfortune and become inordinately
wealthy (Barry 2005, 140-141). Indeed the very notion of the “American Dream”
rests on this assumption. But for a variety of reasons discussed here, just because
someone can rise out of poverty, allegedly the result of nothing but his own
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ingenuity, it does not follow that anyone can do it. Further, it would be difficult to
argue that the wealthy person who inherits a position at his family’s corporation has
“worked harder” a day in his life than say a migrant farm worker or coal miner. For
most people extremely hard work is the road to barely getting by, not riches.
Another important hole in previous notions of social justice that Barry fills is
the evidence highlighting welfare laws and public perception of welfare’s purpose.
Laws are frequently enacted that further needle those getting by at the subsistence
level in order to defend the “rights” of those who have more than they need to keep
what they have (Barry 2005, 152). The primary problem this creates for the
purpose of social justice and further evidence that there is no social justice in the
presence of disparate wealth distribution, as well as further evidence that minimal
standard welfare states do not satisfy the goals of social justice, is that it clearly
reveals a lack of political power of those living in poverty by virtue of their living in
poverty. This poses a problem for the idea that citizens should be treated with equal
concern as argued by Ronald Dworkin, whose ideas will be examined more closely
in the next section.
This focus by politicians on the few rags-to-riches stories or the few welfare
cheats and so on is something Ian Shapiro has labeled “anecdotal distraction,” and it
appears to be a highly effective means of protecting the status quo and promoting
agitation among the lower and middle classes. It also manifests itself as making an
example of someone among the elites who actually gets punished for committing a
crime and by lauding those on welfare who transition into successful workers
(Shapiro 2003, 131-133).
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Barry also addresses the ideal in American culture that individuals are
responsible for their own choices. “Corporations spend a lot of money on promoting
the ‘personal responsibility’ approach, while being at the same time acutely
conscious of their ability to manipulate individual choices and suppress information
that is essential to responsible choosing” (Barry 2005, 154). This illustrates another
example of the very wealthy exerting domination over the masses and profiting
from their lack of power, information and/or choices.
Barry also addresses politics of identity and concludes, just as was posited
earlier in this paper, that more often than not, racism is the result of scapegoating a
particular ethnic group due to economic issues and the fueling of this kind of racism
prevents the underclasses from achieving the necessary solidarity to fight back
against the actual oppressor, which he calls “the rich” (Barry 2005, 182). There is
much evidence of this in the current Mexican/American immigration debate – much
is made of the so-called racism of the poor white Americans who fear losing what
little they have to migrant workers, when in reality, they and the migrant workers
are victims of the same exploitation with only differing levels of severity. It serves
the employers of these workers if they are fighting amongst each other over
something as arbitrary as race rather than recognizing the injustice in their
collective economic positions. Among the middle class this is an issue for
affirmative action, which determines who gets promoted and such – this bickering
about race detracts from the overall decreasing earning power and benefits enjoyed
by all workers (Shapiro 2003, 128).

70

Political inequality doesn’t only manifest in individuals as a result of
individual economic inequality - on a larger scale, political parties that are
established and have wealthy members succeed in suppressing alternative political
ideas and candidates that don’t fit within the current political box by denying them
the funds, media exposure and more generally basic legitimacy necessary to
compete politically (Barry 2005, 239). Wealthy organizations can more efficiently
direct political policy, as can wealthy individuals, who already have exponentially
greater political clout as illustrated in the earlier section regarding oligarchy.
Barry ultimately tries to imagine what a just world would look like, without
being utopian – a seemingly futile endeavor in the field of political theory – and
concludes rightly that one thing a just world must do is “approximate material
equality” (Barry 2005, 216). He does offer some feasible ideas, not for how to
distribute material goods, but what the economic and social costs of avoiding
disparate wealth might be – he asserts that people would be healthier and there
would be less crime among other things. Ultimately he suggests that while some
things would cost money (to be raised in the form of taxes) that costs would be
saved as well (Barry 2005, 220-222). In the end, he asks not if we can afford the
costs of creating a just society, but if we can afford not to promote social justice by
virtue of tempering the degree to which greed is rewarded (Barry 2005, 229).
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Conclusion
All of the works referenced in this chapter presume a more or less capitalist
society with substantial economic inequality. Some of the authors appear to favor
varying degrees of socialist ideals (particularly Michael Walzer), but none of them
question whether economic inequality is simply unjust in and of itself, with the
exception of Brian Barry, a self-proclaimed Democratic Socialist. They all seem to
seek a way to render the structures already in place “more fair and just” rather than
to revolutionize them, and the societies they happen to reference operate under a
degree of capitalism. Capitalist economics rewards greed and vast inequalities of
wealth accumulation are intrinsic to its nature. It presumes, by definition, that a
segment of the population will not be able to obtain as much material resources as it
needs – hence the invention by humanitarians of welfare capitalism. It further goes
without saying that in a liberal political culture that holds individualism, autonomy,
liberty and equality as human virtues that those people at the bottom will be blamed
and abused for their lack of ability to provide for themselves.
But according to Ronald Dworkin this need not be the case. Indeed he claims,
“an egalitarian economy is a basically capitalist economy” (Dworkin 2011, 357).
Dworkin argues that free markets require regulation in order to ensure that the cost
of goods reflects the true opportunity cost of producing those goods – that in the
spirit of equal concern there needs to be protection against monopolies and other
such things that distort an unregulated market (Dworkin 2011, 357). The second
problem with the free market according to Dworkin, is not as simple to resolve, nor
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is it as simple to understand. According to Dworkin’s “envy test,” which is applied
after all theoretical members, who have theoretically begun with equal resources
are left free to pursue their own interests, the person who chose to be a poet will not
be envious of the person who chose a more economically advantageous path,
because not everyone prioritizes accumulating wealth. However, the envy test can
fail in the free market, Dworkin argues, when responsible investments nevertheless
don’t end well or individuals fall ill or injured or lack the specific talents that are
economically viable in a particular place and time, or other such situations in which
a person hasn’t chosen his economic outcome, but is stuck with it nonetheless
(Dworkin 2011, 357). Dworkin is opposed to erasing the consequences of bad luck
on the grounds that it undermines personal responsibility, which is an essential
ingredient of his position on ethics (Dworkin 2011, 358). However, he does devise
an elaborate hypothetical insurance scheme that looks an awful lot like welfare
capitalism in the end, complete with unemployment insurance and social security
and the like (Dworkin 2011, 359-361).
Michael Walzer’s assertion that all basic needs should be met is admirable
toward the goal of being compassionate, as is Dworkin’s notion of more or less a
safety net for those who fall to bad luck, but both are inadequate for creating a just
distribution of resources. Even Rawls acknowledges that satisfying basic human
needs does not satisfy the requirements of a free and equal citizenry. It does
address people’s fundamental needs but does not address their marginalization,
exploitation, vulnerability to abuse or lack of political voice as compared with those
who have far more resources than they need. Rawls’ difference principle attempts
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to always better everyone’s position but it does not address that one group
becoming marginally better off while another group becomes infinitely better off
necessarily upsets the balance of political power and also therefore the basic
principles of justice he holds as constitutional essentials (Barry 2005, 173). Iris
Marion Young’s desire to see a world in which economic inequality is not important
is simply utopian and the Libertarian viewpoint that justice rests in protecting the
rights of the strong and clever over providing for the needs of the weak and less
gifted is grossly inhumane and not conducive to the shared purpose of social life and
the implied reciprocity of civil society.
Wealth is not just a social good among many. Money is used in capitalist
society to purchase education, opportunity and power at all social and political
levels – whether it “should” or not. An effective theory of social justice must accept
this as a given within a capitalist economy and explore the means by which
distribution of resources can both occur fairly and generate a fair and just outcome
immediately and over time. It may be that capitalist economics, however regulated,
is not conducive to this end, but in sum any economic system (or lack thereof) that
allows for vast economic inequality is, by definition, unjust.

74

Chapter 4
Revised Social Justice Theory
In Chapter 4 a political solution is proposed after acknowledging
that this paper has set up the current crisis for social justice in the
United States as a politically created issue. Chapter 4 builds upon
the theories critiqued in Chapter 3. Presuming at this point that
economic inequality is, in fact, a threat to political liberty and
equality of opportunity, a remedy is proposed that suggests that
the best way to deal with the problems created by vast economic
inequality - defined as the current condition in the United States in
which .001% of the population controls 80% of the wealth - is
simply to not allow for it.

The crisis for social justice facing the United States today was created
through the political process; therefore political theory is a proper method to
explore a solution. As Ronald Dworkin points out, an individual’s economic
resources depend only, in part, on his choices, and, in part, on government’s choices.
For example, Laissez-faire economics does not mean “without government
interference,” rather it means government makes one set of laws in lieu of another
(Dworkin 2011, 353-354). The same could be said of progressive era laws. As we
have seen, current American laws tend to benefit some at the expense of others over
time and do not, therefore, treat individuals with equal concern. In this chapter I
will propose an alternative perspective on balancing liberty and equality in a
contemporary capitalist economy, because as Brian Barry argues that if we are
concerned about equal rights, “we should also be concerned about equal
opportunities to exercise those rights” (Barry 2005, 25).
Some of the possible solutions derived from this analysis are not very far
from the policies already favored in American culture, while others are radical
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departures, but all are compatible with a liberal political culture. In this chapter I
will focus on proposing immediate “minimal steps,” following Dworkin, who argues
that in order for a theory of distributive justice to be useful, it should have minimal
steps that can be taken immediately as steps in the right direction and need not
create utopian theories (Dworkin 2011, 352).
I propose the following four steps to moderate economic inequality as a
means to moderate political inequality. Presuming as true Brian Barry’s claim that
social justice requires tempering the degree to which greed is rewarded, my
suggestion accepts Walzer’s proposal for a minimum standard but insists that it be
universal and not means tested – ensuring certain goods are provided to all not as
welfare but as a public good. I also supplement Walzer’s theory by adding a ceiling
for wealth accumulation. On the topic of inheritance, I will build onto Rawls’ theory
of taxation of inherited wealth by setting an absolute cap on the provision of
inherited wealth as well. Regarding equalizing the income gap I propose a revised
minimum wage and revised income tax scheme that disproportionately burdens
high earners and corporations.
Below I defend and place these ideas within the context of contemporary and
modern political theory.

Minimum Standard
Some of the work examined in this paper advocates for a minimum standard
of basic welfare due citizens, which while admirable, does not meet the
requirements of social justice as articulated by the paper. The notion that
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everyone’s basic needs should be met still suggests that the person with more is
more entitled to have more, but ought to be generous enough to provide for those
who are not necessarily deserving – essentially a welfare model. Echoing Rousseau
I suggest, “You are undone if you once forget that the fruits of the earth belong to us
all, and the earth itself to nobody” (Rousseau 1993, 84). I propose that while some
labors, goods or services may be more valuable in the monetary sense, that none are
so valuable that one or a few people among us should be controlling excessive
amounts of wealth while others are impoverished. The welfare capitalist state that
John Rawls is willing to accept as just may offer humans the bare minimum to
sustain life but it does not acknowledge equality of dignity or equality of the right to
live in a dignified fashion by virtue of being a member of a civil society. Walzer
touches on this, suggesting that distributive justice addresses both need and
“membership” in society, and it is not only necessary to address people’s most basic
needs, it is also important to provide the goods necessary to “sustain their
membership” (Walzer 1983, 78). For these reasons, following Brian Barry I propose
that the minimum standard must be universal as opposed to means-tested
(Barry2005, 218). This standard could be implemented on an ad hoc and
evolutionary basis by slowly implementing more and more minimum standards
encompassing basic needs for both survival and ensuring equal opportunity. For
example, providing over time free levels of education, housing, utilities, internet
access, food, health care, elementary and advanced education, etcetera in an order
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and timing that is politically viable or otherwise desirable.6 This is a less polarizing
way of looking at equalization of resources.

Wealth Tax and Cap
The theorists analyzed in this paper, other than Rousseau, appear to ignore
the problems of wealth accumulation. Rawls’ theory doesn’t provide any limit on
the accumulation of wealth as long as the difference principle is satisfied. However,
even when the difference principle is satisfied disparate wealth accumulation is
problematic because of its tendency to lead to political inequality. As Brian Barry
argues, some people become relatively worse off, even if their economic position
hasn’t changed for the worse, because others’ positions have changed for the better,
leaving the first group absolutely worse off (Barry 2005, 173). If we alter our
perspective from “it shouldn’t matter” because political equality must precede the
difference principle to “it does matter” because that is the nature of a capitalist
economy, then Rawls’ conclusion that there need not be limits on wealth
accumulation are undermined. A limit seems rightly imposed to obtain the goals
that Rawls is arguing for – political equality and equality of opportunity.

6

What exactly the minimum standard should be or how it should be determined is unfortunately
beyond the scope of this paper to address, but it should reflect a concern for human dignity and a
respect for the importance of the opportunity to develop one’s talents and pursue one’s goals, if born
into the situation of having nothing more than the minimum standard.
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Similarly, Walzer argues that wealth accumulation should not matter as long
as all citizens have a minimum standard (their basic needs met) and as long as
money cannot buy important things such as opportunities, education, political office,
etc. Again, in the absence of restrictions that unequivocally ensure that money
cannot buy important things, imposing limits on wealth disparity will help to ensure
that money cannot operate outside its sphere. Walzer’s view that money should not
operate outside its sphere is sound and may be a workable theory in some economic
structures, but in a capitalist economy, excessive wealth does not only afford one
the ability to purchase a few more trinkets and widgets, but also threatens political
equality. It’s critical that a social justice theory recognize the danger massive wealth
accumulation poses to political inequality and equality of opportunity. Walzer’s
assertion that inequality of wealth need not be problematic because money ought
not buy certain goods such as political power is noble, but there is too much
evidence that, as Rousseau pointed out, there is danger to the notion of political
power when wealth inequity is so great that one person can effectively purchase
another for us to simply leave Walzer’s theory where it stands. Empirical evidence
indicates that money does and will operate outside its preferred sphere of influence
and it is therefore useful to attempt to construct a theory that begins with that
assumption.
As such, a constitutional amendment to allow for the direct taxation of
wealth, as well as to impose an absolute cap on wealth accumulation is a step in the
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right direction.7 The excess accumulated wealth can then be used for the common
good by providing benefits such as food, housing, education, medical care and other
goods necessary for the purpose of social justice theory.

Inheritance Tax and Cap
I propose that strict limits be placed on inheritance using an absolute cap on
the amount of inheritable wealth. This is a result of my analysis in chapter three
that inheritance does not meet the criteria of the difference principle as well as my
agreement with Brian Barry that vast wealth inequality is the “great enemy of social
justice,” and inheritance does nothing but continue and increase wealth inequality
with the greatest of ease.
Rawls explores a little bit about limiting wealth accumulation through
various possible taxation strategies – inheritance and progressive income tax to
prevent the tendency for the difference principle to create wealth allocations that
are “inimical to background justice” (Rawls 2001, 160-161). Walzer views
inheritance as a special form of gift-giving and does not appear troubled by it so
long as it is a commodity or money and has no “power” attached to it (Walzer 1983,
126-128). Dworkin argues for an inheritance tax progressive and high enough to
avoid stratification, and posits using the tax for public education and other
programs that ease the stratification that remains. (Dworkin 2000, 349). Dworkin’s
7

There is a problem with this solution – as Brian Barry points out, the obvious reason this is not
generally done is that if the state takes back too much of people’s wealth, the wealthy will simply take
their capital to a more capital friendly state (Barry 2005, 192). The ideal (and impractical) way of
addressing this is to hope it might be an international policy. Absent that, an exorbitant exit tax and
renounced citizenship rights could curb attempts to circumvent this policy.
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desire to avoid stratification is important for social justice, and a possible way to
avoid stratification is to simply impose a cap on the amount of wealth that is
inheritable.
In theory, as Dworkin argues as well, given equal opportunity, some people
will value higher pay and others will value something other than making as much
money as possible. Unequal income distribution is not problematic for social justice
theory in itself, which is why graduated income tax and minimum wage reform are
only small parts of the solution posited by this thesis. What is problematic is the
unchecked accumulation of wealth over time through inheritance, the greatest
benefits of that wealth being to those who never worked a day to earn it, while
others who did not happen to win the “birth lottery” work hard for scarce reward.
While the liberal tradition (and certainly American political culture) may bristle at
this perceived attack on property rights, this is a good point at which to remember
that property rights are not the only rights that matter – and social justice demands
that the right of all to accumulate and inherit wealth be balanced with the right of all
to be treated as a fair and equal citizens.

Minimum Wage/More Progressive Income Tax
Another important element of social justice, as all of the philosophers
examined here, with the exception of Nozick, point out, is a minimum standard, and
a minimum wage and more progressive income tax comport with this goal. As
pointed out above, above a minimum standard of welfare by itself is not compatible
with the goals of social justice theory as set forth in this paper. It’s important in
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American political culture that a minimum standard be rights-based as well as
universal, whether that be the best way to frame the issue or not.8 One way to
facilitate a minimum standard that is compatible with a notion of equality of
inherent dignity, as was mentioned earlier, is to tie the minimum wage to the
average wage (including executive compensation) and to ensure that minimum
wages keep pace with inflation. This is critical and should be agreeable even to
libertarians, if in fact they are concerned with individuals’ ability to freely enter into
a contract. Too many people too desperate for work is a recipe for unfair labor
negotiations; therefore there is no sound liberal argument for allowing it.
Additionally, it is a way to ensure a minimum standard that is not confused with the
notion of welfare, as in the wealthy “giving something to” or “doing something for”
the poor, which is an affront to human dignity. This is especially an appropriate
remedy to propose for the United States because it redistributes wealth in a way
that does not burden government directly and is connected to work, therefore it is
likely to appeal to the average voter in American political culture (Shapiro 2003,
115). In fact, as illustrated in chapter one, the majority of Americans do support a
more progressive minimum wage. Protecting the rights of all citizens by equalizing
their bargaining positions and protecting their equality of opportunity satisfies the
goals of liberalism, ethics and social justice at once.

Some theorists such as Elizabeth Wolgast make a strong argument that thinking about all social
goods in terms of “rights” may be a hindrance to thinking about social justice. And certainly
following Ronald Dworkin and others, social justice could be analyzed in the simple language of
ethics. But for the purpose of this paper, we’re not going to re-invent the fundamental nature of the
controversy as it occurs in the contemporary United States – the argument for distributive justice is
perfectly strong using a a rights-based approach.
8
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Progressive income tax is another method of equalizing incomes, but most
importantly, income tax should be structured in a way that heavily burdens
excessively high wage earners (like CEOs), capital gains, stock options (when
offered in lieu of direct monetary compensation), interest income, dividend income
and corporate profits, as opposed to simply burdening small business owners and
moderately high wage earners such as doctors. As demonstrated in chapter one,
there was a time when corporations provided more federal revenue and payroll
taxes provided less – there is no rational reason to not return there.
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Conclusion

We began this paper by examining the findings of the American Political
Science Association and questioned their conclusion that vast income disparity may
be implicated in political inequality - defined as people’s power to create and amend
policies that affect them. It appears from the research subsequently conducted and
analyzed in this paper that income inequality is indeed implicated in political
inequality, as well as inequality of opportunity. This in turn poses a problem for
individual liberty – defined as the ability to direct one’s own life and pursue the
things that matter to him/her.
In chapter one we examined the empirical evidence supporting a correlation
between economic and political inequality and inequality of opportunity. It was
shown that the current levels of economic inequality appear to correlate, if not
cause, substantial political inequality.
In chapter two we examined the importance of equality, the relationship
between liberty and economic position, and the evolution of liberal thought on these
issues. We found that equality matters, that individual liberty is largely dependent
upon economic position, and that liberal thought has traditionally evaded the
inherent conflict between economic and political equality.
In chapter three we examine how contemporary political theory has finally
begun to address these issues after recognizing that economic equality matters for
the purpose of social justice theory. We uncovered different opinions regarding the
degree of inequality that can be tolerated for the sake of individual liberty and the
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conditions that render those degrees of inequality more or less just. I demonstrated
that some income inequality must be tolerated in a culture that values liberty and
autonomy, but that social justice requires that the gap between the richest and the
poorest be narrow enough that it does not damage the prospects of the least well off
or allow the advantaged to exert oppressive power over the less advantaged.
In chapter four I offered some solutions for correcting the level of wealth
inequality that is the natural outcome of unregulated capitalism and has developed
in the United States due to a series of economic policy revisions. I suggested most
importantly that there should be a ceiling for wealth accumulation. An amendment
to the constitution to permit or even require the taxation of accumulated wealth
above a certain level, a cap on the amount of wealth that is inheritable rather than
an increased estate or inheritance tax percentage, and to a lesser degree a greater
graduated income tax could all work together to accomplish this end theoretically. I
also suggested a universal minimum standard, including minimum wage reform. A
just society can allow for some inequality of wealth, but not the degree to which it
exists in the United States, and nothing perpetuates inequality more than the policy
of allowing tremendous wealth to be inherited.
Further it appears that simple income inequality is not as dangerous in this
regard as is accumulated wealth disparity. That one’s station at birth best indicates
his/her economic outcome in life is evidence of a de facto aristocracy in the United
States and is a threat to the American ideal of liberty. To combat this trend is an
important concern for political theory. Economic equality may not continually be
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subordinated to economic liberty if political equality and equality of opportunity
matter.
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